JPRS 75837

6 June 1980

Vietnam Report

No. 2192

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

JPRS 75837

6 June 1980

VIETNAM REPORT

No. 2192

CONTENTS

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

Army Improvement Campaign Reviewed, Urged On
(TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Feb 80) 1

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

Overall Crisis in Chinese Army Discussed
(Quyet Thang; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Feb 80) 13

1968, Bilateral CEMA General Delivery Conditions Compared
(Ha Hien Hoang; NGOAI THUONG, Mar 79)..... 20

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

Measures To Ensure Correct Issuance of Party Cards Recommended
(Le Tat Thang; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Feb 80) ... 28

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

Details of Directive on 1980 State Plan Drafting Published
(TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA, Aug 79) 34

Labor Balancing as Precondition for Plan Balancing Discussed
(Trinh Trong Quy; TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA, Aug 79) 40

Details of 1979 State Plan Adjustments Revealed
(TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA, Aug 79) 52

Role of State Bank in Exporting Discussed
(Nguyen Duy Lo; NGOAI THUONG, Jan 79)..... 61

Development of Short-Term Crops for Export Urged
(Pham Thinh; NGOAI THUONG, Jan 79) 70

Increased Export of Trade Tools Urged
(Nam Ha; NGOAI THUONG, Jan 79) 73

Ideas Offered About Activities of Foreign Trade Stations
(Vu Huu Tuu; NGOAI THUONG, May 79) 77

Shortcomings in Food Management
(NHAN DAN, 26 Feb 80) 83

Strengthen Inspection and Control
(Editorial; NHAN DAN, 23 Feb 80) 85

Briefs
Artisan Industry, Handicrafts Sector 87

AGRICULTURE

Briefs
Ha Son Binh Planting 88

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

Building Material Industry Development
(Editorial; NHAN DAN, 25 Feb 80) 89

BIOGRAPHIC

Information on Vietnamese Personalities..... 91

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ARMY IMPROVEMENT CAMPAIGN REVIEWED, URGED ON

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese
No 2, Feb 80 pp 50-59

[Unattributed Article: "Consolidate and Develop the Results Obtained, Move Forward to Successfully Complete the Large Campaign"]

[Text] Over the past year, under the leadership of the Party Central Committee nnd the Central Military Party Committee, due to the close coordination of all sectors from the central to local level and owing to an enthusiastic response from the entire people, the campaign "to develop the good nature and increase the combat power" of the people's armed forces which was launched by the Party Central Committee Secretariat has been conducted everywhere with increasing width and depth and has reaped good initial results. A new progressive step has been made by the entire army. Both at the front and in the rear and among both the main and local forces, a qualitative change has been effected by the absolute majority of units, organs, institutes, schools, national defense factories, combat-ready units and units undergoing training or engaged in economic construction. This change has been fairly good in many units and even satisfactory in some of them and new typical models and elements have emerged. An overall glance shows that a very important improvement has been made in the combined quality, combat power and combat readiness of the armed forces, that leadership and guidance have played a more stable role and that these factors positively contributee to the 1979 glorious victory.

The change effected and result obtained in 1979 are only an initial achievement but they represent a very important turn in the struggle to heighten quality, combat power and combat readiness. The basic problems related to the military line in a war to defend the fatherland have been uniformly tackled on a more profound and comprehensive theoretical and realistic basis. This is a very important topic of a short- and long-range strategic significance with regard to the task of defending the country and building the armed forces. The military, political and professional standards have been raised and the system of technical cadres and organs strengthened. The technical and tactical standards of cadres, combatants and small

detachments have shown an evident shift. The school system and the training of cadres in schools have been further rearranged and weapons and equipment properly adjusted. The task of ensuring the rear service technique has been strengthened. Cadres and combatants have become more aware of the new situation and mission, clearly distinguished the enemy and displayed a high determination to fight. Party organizations have been consolidated and developed with many new members. Compared with February 1979, the national defense organization has become much more stable from the point of view of position and power. The battle position of the entire country is ready and strong enough to defeat any war of aggression recklessly launched by the enemy.

These results have created favorable conditions and laid a firm basis for continuously stepping up the campaign in 1980 with a view to successfully carrying out the task of defending and building the fatherland.

After carrying on the campaign for a year, we have gained some important experiences in the task of providing guidance.

First, it is necessary to take into account our country's shift to a new revolutionary stage, the emergence of a new target for our people's combat strategy, the very great new demands of the task of defending and building the fatherland and the development of the organizational structure and combat method of our armed forces in order to be able to correctly realize the great strategic significance of the urgent task of heightening the quality and combined strength of the people's armed forces which are considered to be the nucleus in waging a people's war to defend the fatherland. There must be a correct concept of the quality and combined strength of the people's armed forces so as to develop the sense of responsibility for the conduct of the campaign among all levels and sectors.

Using a combined strength and a high quality to vanquish a large numerical strength of the enemy is a matter of principle which has so far enabled our people to win victory in their mission of liberating and defending the fatherland. This principle must be grasped more firmly by our people and our armed forces in fighting against Chinese expansionism in collusion with imperialism headed by the U.S. imperialists. This truth has been demonstrate once again by the victory of our people and army who smashed two wars of aggression recently launched by the enemy--one at our southwestern frontier and another waged at our northern border by 600,000 troops of the Beijing reactionaries.

To meet the demands of the task of defending the fatherland during the new revolutionary phase marked by the struggle against the Chinese reactionaries' war of aggression, it is necessary to build the people's armed forces--including the main force, the local troops and the self-defense militia--into a nucleus so as to form a combined strength of the entire people to fight the enemy, taking into consideration the new conditions in our country. This is a highly important fundamental problem not only for the time being

but also in the far future concerning our people's task of victoriously defending the socialist fatherland and successfully building socialism. This is a matter of survival for the entire nation and for the present and future generations. Therefore, an important duty of the entire party, people and army is to build the armed forces and to increase the combat power of various categories of troops. It is on the basis of this urgent objective necessity that a great campaign has been launched and directly guided by the Party Central Committee Secretariat and jointly carried out by the responsible levels and sectors. Realities have confirmed that only by grasping this objective requirement of the revolution and correctly understanding the large strategic scope of this campaign can one have a high determination and take sound measures to organize the implementation of this campaign and can one achieve the required success. Though under combat and construction conditions similar to those of other units, Regiment B60 and many progressive units have registered initial achievements and progress because the party committees at various echelons and the unit heads have grasped the meaning of the campaign rather firmly and have guided it correctly and carried it out satisfactorily.

The experiences drawn by many units have also demonstrated the need for a correct concept of the quality and combined strength of our armed forces. This quality and combined strength of our armed forces must not be separated from the strength of our entire people and country and the strength of the present era. In particular, the quality and combat power of the armed forces represent a strength constituted by many factors--revolutionary nature, military abilities, ideological and organizational standards, human beings and material installations including weapons and technical equipment, qualifications and ownership abilities of cadres and combatants, and numerical strength, organizational structure and leadership mechanism of various troops, armed services and localities. These factors continuously develop along with developments in the situation and tasks during the new revolutionary stage and will develop to a very high degree during the war to defend the fatherland as compared with the liberation war. Such a quality and combined strength can be created only through a close coordination of various levels and sectors under party leadership and the responsibility for this matter lies first with the armed forces. The main objectives, topics and targets of the campaign are mainly to heighten the overall quality and strength of the people's armed forces in order to meet the said development requirements.

During the recent phase of the campaign, the results obtained by various units and localities are of different degrees because of the different levels of understanding of the abovementioned basic concept of the quality and combined strength of our armed forces. On the nationwide scale, a new progressive step has been taken to boost the quality and combat power of the people's war because the Political Bureau, the Party Central Committee Secretariat and the Government Council have provided concentrated and uniform guidance and also because administrative agencies and mass organizations at all levels have, together with the local people, strenuously tried to

heighten the quality and increase the strehgth of their respective levels, sectors and localities. As far as our armed forces are concerned, owing to the direct guidance given by the Central Military Party Committee, to the fact that all military regions and corps, branches of services, arms and units have considered the campaign to be "a central task of party organizations in the army and also of the entire army in the 1979-1980 2-year period" according to the spirit of directives issued by the higher echelon--each level has done its best to build itself and the lower levels and has, therefore, reaped an initial but very fundamental success in the recent past.

It can be said that the recent success of the campaign is one of the implementation of the "army-people single-mindedness" and "all-army single-mindedness" slogans. This result will be limited wherever and whenever one fails to thoroughly understand the necessity of heightening quality and increasing combined strength, wherever and whenever one thinks that only certain organs are responsible for the campaign, wherever and whenever one pays attention only to some aspects of the campaign and not to the need to evenly promote all units or if one takes care only of the lower echelons and not of one's own level.

On the basis of a thorough understanding of the politico-military line and task of the party and of the strategic significance and substance of the need to improve the quality and combined strength of the armed forces, it is necessary to clearly and specifically dete mine the political task and struggle objective for each military region, corps, branch of service, arm, level, sector and area and to translate this task and objective into a program of self-conscious and energetic action by cadres and combatants. It is necessary to build and strengthen regiments, districts and other types of grassroots units of the armed forces, thus creating bases for improving quality and combat power.

A thorough understanding of the revolutionary line and task set forth by the party must be reflected in the effect of practical activities and in realistic actions and must, through the medium of an effective organization of concrete implementation, transform party line and policy into revolutionary action by the masses and lead to real success. Throughout this campaign, a thorough understanding of the military concept and line of the party concerning the task of defending and building the fatherland must be manifested by an urgent conduct and effective execution of the tasks of building forces, consolidating battle positions, achieving combat readiness, fighting to foil all enemy schemes and acts and fulfilling production and economic construction duties and international obligations. It follows that the revolutionary line and task and the common mission of the armed forces must be materialized by the political tasks and specific objectives of each unit--which requires that guidance be provided to carry out these tasks and objectives most efficiently in order to turn them into a moral and material strength and bring about an improvement in the new quality and strength of the unit.

Experiences gained over the past year have demonstrated that the guidance provided to lead action will be less effective, that the result of the campaign implementation will be poor and that units will progress only slowly wherever one merely copies or quotes the higher echelons' directives and resolutions without setting forth specific task and endeavor goals, wherever, for the sake of appearance, one limits oneself to propagandizing the overall meaning and objective of the campaign instead of taking measures to meticulously organize the execution of each step and task and without making an in-depth study of the scientific-technical problems proper to each sector and type of target, and wherever one deals only with general topics in making reviews and reports.

Specifying the political task and endeavor norm for each unit and individual is a painstaking scientific chore. It is wrong to set forth these tasks and norms at random. Such tasks and norms must be consistent with objective requirements and conformable to the spirit of the resolutions, directives and orders of the higher levels and these norms must aim at making the most of the entire unit's capabilities. A norm must be set for each level and individual; everyone from the commander to the combatant must have an activity plan and a yardstick which must be attained within a fixed time limit in accordance with each campaign phase and which must clearly reflect the high struggle spirit and energy of each one in defending and building the fatherland.

Organs from the ministry to military regions and corps, branches of service, arms, divisions and provincial units must be strong; at the same time, basic units of the main and local forces must also be powerful and must thoroughly understand the party line and policy, satisfactorily carry out the campaign and materialize and accomplish at all costs the tasks and norms assigned to each unit. This is an essential condition for making the entire army strong and successfully conducting the war to defend the fatherland by closely coordinating the people's war involving mobile main-force corps with the local people's war.

Basic units, companies, battalions, regiments, hamlets, villages and districts are places which directly turn the party line and policy into realities and are also grassroots organizations which strive to heighten the combined quality and combined strength of the people's war and all-people's national defense. To acquire an in-depth dimension, the campaign must be well organized and implemented at the grassroots level and be converted into self-imposed action by each combatant and unit member.

Regiments and districts are basic units which occupy a highly important position in the all-people's national defense and the people's war to defend the fatherland. Only if guidance is intensified and if the organization of the campaign implementation is stepped up at the regiment and district level will the campaign really have a broad and profound mass character and develop continuously and only then will units effect a quick and firm shift and will new typical models and elements come to light.

Naturally, the building of regiments and districts must not be dissassociated from the building and strengthening of companies, battalions and villages; also, to speak of building regiments and districts does not mean only that this task is to be assumed by the regiment and district level alone but also that it must be carried out at all echelons according to their respective positions and functions.

Over the recent past, many regiments and districts have made progress in some respect but only a few of them have become typical models of steady and overall progress. This is due not so much to the low standards of the masses at the grassroots level, to the instability of and disparities in the organizational apparatus and to difficult material conditions...but mainly to shortcomings committed in providing guidance. Being at a basic level, regiments and districts need be fully aware of their role in the campaign and must carry out research and must ponder, bring their sense of responsibility and creativeness into play and offer tight, specific and overall guidance to each company, detachment, village and installation. The high levels must devote sufficient efforts to guiding the campaign implementation at the basic unit level of regiments and districts, to maintaining close contact with the various targets and forces and to specifying, standardizing and systematizing all types of models in order to decentralize management and advanced training. However, the building of typical models must aim not only at helping some weak units build themselves up and still less at building some "main units;" instead, what is important is to multiply and popularize typical models to help all grassroots units, regiments and districts progress equally, thus laying a solid foundation for the people's war with its mobile main-force corps as well as for the local people's war and thus ensuring initiative in the war to defend the fatherland.

Setting forth political tasks and determining specific struggle goals is a major step which must be taken carefully; however, the campain will win final success only if the execution of these tasks is organized and if all-out efforts are made to achieve these specific norms. In organizing task execution, all levels must display eagerness, initiative and creativeness and work out realistic policies and measures consistent with the demands and theme of the campaign and conformable to the particular situation and mission of each unit and to the specific localities and periods of time. A basic measure to develop initiative and creativeness in organizing task execution is to train and build a body of cadres who constantly set good examples and heighten their overall standards and capabilities.

Once a sound line and policy have been mapped out, a stage which plays a decisive role in ensuring success is to organize the execution of tasks with a view to converting such line and policy into revolutionary action by the masses and into a mass movement; meanwhile, cadres constitute a decisisive factor during the process of organizing task execution. This has been clearly demonstrated by realities in the revolution and in the

building and fighting tasks of our people's armed forces and by actual facts taking place during the conduct of the campaign over the past year.

The progress made by most units in 1979 was not due to the existence of additional new material conditions. Though faced with numerous difficulties at the beginning of the campaign, some units managed to make the most of their own capabilities and to bring about a favorable change because their cadres displayed a high determination and took sound measures to organize the execution of tasks.

To skillfully organize task implementation, cadres must thoroughly understand the party line and policy, grasp the higher levels' directives and resolutions, be fully aware of the situation in each unit and have a sufficient overall and specialized knowledge. In view of the present cause of national defense and construction, the mission of the armed forces, in general, and each unit, in particular, is very urgent, complex and replete with innovations. Cadres--especially high- and middle-ranking ones--must have a sufficient theoretical knowledge to correctly solve the relationships between the duties to the nation and the international obligations, between the political task and the military one, between the economy and national defense, between combat duty and combat readiness, on the one hand, and production performance, on the other, between the common interests of the country and the peculiar interests of the armed forces and between the common interests of the entire army and the special ones of each military region and corps, and each branch of service, arm and unit. Cadres at each level must grasp and soundly solve the relationships among strategy, campaign and tactics and also the connection between the frontline and the rear and between short- and long-term problems. Only if these requirements are fulfilled can one organize satisfactory implementation, bring each unit's potentials into full play, concentrate abilities on the most important points, finish jobs on weak points and achieve overall progress.

The organization of task execution also requires each level to do it utmost resolutely and willingly, to consider subjective efforts principal, to refrain from relying on the higher levels and waiting for favorable objective conditions, and to constantly try to move forward to overcome difficulties and gradually promote its own's units. Ideology and organization must be linked and so must military concept and military organization, with varied and versatile forms of politico-ideological indoctrination to arouse patriotism, love for socialism, revolutionary heroism and proletarian internationalism and to promote combat spirit and the sense of self-sacrifice and collective ownership. Simultaneously, there must be meticulous plans and lively, practical and specific measures to guide the action of each organ, unit and individual in order to achieve the set objectives.

The organization of task execution is a science and also an art. To organize the implementation of such a large campaign of a broad mass, revolutionary, scientific, composite and overall character as is being conducted

by us, a guidance and command as painstaking, tight and meticulous as that provided for combat purposes is essential.

This explains the very high and strict demands placed on cadres. Whether the implementation of the campaign is well organized or not depends mainly on the strength or weakness of the body of cadres. It is, therefore, necessary to pay the greatest attention to taking various measures to train cadres. At a time when tasks are urgent and when forces are vigorously developing while intensifying their building rate and standing ready to fight, a highly important measure to be taken is to focus on the training of cadres and to coordinate this job with the task of organizing and guiding them to teach and train themselves through the realities of task execution.

Training cadres is an important measure to develop their initiative and creativeness during the organization of the campaign implementation and is, at the same time, a basic measure to heighten the units' quality. There is an uniformity between the quality of units and that of the campaign conducted within them. This unit quality must be intensely manifested in the quality of leadership exercised by party committee collectives at different echelons and also in the quality of the body of cadres. This is a question of relationships between organizations and human beings. The presence of a strong organization is conducive to the emergency of strong human beings and, conversely, the presence of strong human beings is essential if the organization's strength is to be highly developed. If there is a body of good cadres who can skillfully organize task implementation, the campaign will have good results and units will acquire a new quality; conversely, the campaign results and the units' new quality will promote the training and improvement of the body of cadres.

Experiences drawn from many units have demonstrated that any favorable shift in a unit and in the campaign within it always stems from a change among cadres, especially within the body of core cadres. Once this body of cadres has effected a steady change, the entire unit will certainly progress without interruption, the campaign will develop extensively and intensively and realistic effects will ultimately be felt in the performance of both tasks--building and fighting.

Whether the campaign implementation quality in each unit is high or low and whether cadres in this unit display more or less initiative and creativeness depend on many factors but the principal reason is the subjective endeavor, struggle spirit, progressiveness and overall standards of the cadres at all levels in the unit. While the high levels must provide advanced training for low-level cadres, cadres at every level must perform self-teaching and self-training in all fields--politics, military science including strategies, command and tactics, technique, command, managerial organization and ideological task--and closely coordinate all these tasks in order to stimulate, maintain and develop the revolutionary action movement and to achieve the fixed objectives, thus helping continuously put the theme of the party line into practice, detecting core elements for use in the advanced training of cadres, admitting new members into the party and building ever stronger units.

The above analysis shows that this campaign is linked to the implementation of all tasks of our armed forces and that unit heads at all levels must, therefore, directly guide and command the campaign as they do in combat. In guiding and commanding the campaign, it is necessary to apply strictness, to firmly grasp problems relating to guidelines and principles as well as the actual situation, to set good examples in executing tasks and to simultaneously lead each unit to completely finish central tasks involved in the fulfillment of each norm.

To guide the campaign is precisely to guide the overall building and fighting task of each unit. Building and fighting must be closely related, combat readiness and the heightening of combined strength considered as a single task and satisfactory building aimed at successful fighting. While fighting, it is always necessary to perform building and to properly carry out the campaign which encompasses all construction and combat aspects and which must not be carried on only during the building process. It is, therefore, completely right to say that the problem of guiding and commanding the campaign is as important as that of guiding and commanding combat activities and to consider it a duty of unit heads. It is unthinkable that while adequate guidance and command are exercised to help units build up and fight, poor guidance and command are given to the campaign and vice versa.

An important lesson to be applied in providing guidance and command is the need for earnestness and strictness which must be displayed in guiding and commanding both building and combat activities. Earnestness and strictness must be exercised in all kinds of work from a thorough understanding of objectives and meanings to the transmission and dissemination of directives and orders, the specification of objectives and themes, the mapping out of plans and measures to organize the execution of tasks, the use of various forces, the conduct of activities and supervision, the making of preliminary and complete recapitulations and reports, and the drawing of experiences. Each of these tasks requires positive action by unit heads.

The most concentrated and outstanding manifestation of earnestness and strictness in guidance is a firm grasp of the basic problems concerning party line and resolutions; this is necessary for steering all types of tasks in the direction and within the scope indicated by these lines and resolutions no matter how complex developments of the situation may be.

The situation in 1979 was marked by very urgent and complex developments and by the emergence of many new problems. Nevertheless, all levels firmly focused on ensuring a thorough understanding of the politico-military line and mission of the party as well as the basic problems relating to the cause of national defense. Such an understanding was achieved first among high- and middle-ranking cadres and extended from them to the entire army. This is a great success of the guidance exercised over the past year and is also the most important result of the first year of implementation of the campaign and thus constitutes a solid basis for successful conduct of the campaign in the subsequent year.

Experiences have clearly demonstrated that if the situation evolves more quickly, if the developments and changes become more complex, whenever a decisive shift is required following a great revolutionary success and also whenever new difficulties appear, it will be more necessary to display firmness, steadfastness and a thorough understanding of the party line, to scientifically analyze and examine the law of evolution of the situation and to refrain from showing either subjectivism or pessimism, from confusing strategy with tactics and true nature with appearance and from slighting the set objectives and missions.

A thorough, deep understanding of the party line and policy must be used as a basis for accurately visualizing the basic situation, specifying qualitative goals, drawing up short- and long-term programs and plans to heighten the units' quality and promptly readjusting plans according to situation developments. Preliminary and complete reviews must be carried out honestly, courageously and objectively and the habit of taking merits for oneself and imputing errors to objective circumstances must be avoided.

In strictly guiding and commanding the conduct of the campaign, unit heads must keep close relationships with basic units and personally visit them to study the situation, to draw precise conclusions, to quickly guide and help these units and to realistically solve their difficulties. Unit heads must take this opportunity to revise the quality and efficacy of the guidance exercised by their respective levels, to reexamine and readjust norms, plans and measures and to continuously improve concepts, the sense of responsibility and working methods and manners. Special care must be taken to quickly detect new factors and typical models and to inspect, confirm and further train progressive units unilaterally and comprehensively and from small-sized ones such as companies, battalions, hamlets and villages to large-sized ones such as regiments, divisions, districts and provinces. To earnestly build progressive typical models is a scientific task of the leadership art which is incompatible with the practice of drawing hasty conclusions, insisting on perfection and falsely magnifying and adorning the truth for the sake of appearance, thus lessening the effect of the study of the examples set by typical models.

During the [current] 2-year period, through concentrated phases of resolute, all-out efforts, the campaign aims at completely finishing each central task required by the set objectives and at fulfilling these objectives at all costs. For this reason, unit heads must assess the overall situation, have comprehensive plans and simultaneously delimit different phases, accurately foresee time limits and forces, take coordinated ideological and organizational measures, ensure material supplies, direct experiments, draw experiences, quickly solve newly emerging contradictions and maintain close contact with weak units and localities beset by difficulties.

After conducting the campaign for a year, we have made preliminary reports and drawn many good experiences. While proceeding with the implementation

of the campaign and taking into account their individual characteristics and conditions, each unit, organ and locality have also made numerous innovations in providing guidance and drawn valuable experiences. Though not representing all of the experiences gathered by us, the abovementioned experiences are the most basic and important ones for all levels. To reaffirm these experiences is truly to reconfirm the major principles and compelling conditions which are of an all-inclusive nature and which play a key role in organising he campaign implementation in order to successfully achieve the campaign objectives in 1980 and meet the urgent requirements that our people's armed forces brilliantly fulfill their historic mission in the new stage.

Together with the entire people, our people's armed forces are beginning the year 1980 with a seething revolutionary enthusiasm for emulating in scoring achievements to greet several great holidays: the 50th founding anniversary of our party, the 90th birthday of President Ho Chi Minh and the 35th bounding anniversary of our state; 1980 is a year when our entire party, people and army will try to fulfill two important missions of the whole country: building socialism and defending the fatherland. The central task of the armed forces is to intensify combat preparations and to heighten their own combined quality.

The requirements, theme and objectives of the campaign "to develop the good nature and increase the combat power" of the people's armed forces set forth by the Party Central Committee Secretariat will remain the basic guidelines for our entire army's efforts to carry out tasks.

Based on the experiences recapitulated over the past year and by adhering to the guideline on development and consolidation of the results obtained and on the need to consolidate them in order to develop them, our entire army must concentrate on stepping up and deepening the campaign and must, by all means, achieve all of its objectives with a higher quality. This must be a regular central task and a basic measure to be carried out throughout 1980 by the guidance apparatus at all levels with the aim of building our people's armed forces into outstandingly mature ones. In heighteneng the combined quality of our armed forces, it is necessary to grasp the guideline that these forces be built into a powerful revolutionary people's army with an increasingly high degree of regularization and modernization--an army which stands ready to fight and is determined to defend the fatherland while performing productive labor to contribute to economic and national construction. While providing overall guidance for the implementation of the campaign as a whole in 1980, efforts must be concentrate on satisfactorily executing the following tasks: build stable and strong party organizations in the army; heighten the quality of task execution, the combat spirit and skill and the sense of responsibility, organization and discipline; and revamp the body of cadres quantitatively and qualitatively by strengthening their abilities and sense of responsibility in commanding, training and managing troops and in administering material-

technical bases, by improving the working method at all levels and by making the organization of task execution more effective.

Nineteen eighty is a year when our people's armed forces will resolutely and satisfactorily complete this campaign and is also a year which splendidly closes a decade of glorious victories of our Vietnamese nation. Let all cadres and combatants do their utmost to fulfill all missions so as to be worthy of a heroic army and nation.

9332
CSO: 4209

OVERALL CRISIS IN CHINESE ARMY DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 2, Feb 80 pp 65-71

[Article by Quyet Thang: The Beijing Expansionists' Army Is Deeply Plunged in Crisis"]

[Text] A year after being defeated in the war of aggression against Vietnam, the chinese Army has been completely degraded by the reactionary and treacherous political line of the Beijing authorities and is now being plunged into an acute crisis. The Beijing propaganda apparatus has ceaselessly boasted that "our army will become a winged tiger if modernization is carried out" (PEOPLE'S DAILY) and that "our army will be an invincible one in the world" (RED FLAG) and so forth. Though numerous measures have been taken under the "five stages of army administration," the expansionists' army in the "post-Mao era" has not yet achieved "unity and stability" to "take the lead in the new long march" aimed at "modernizing" China and moving forward to "conquer the entire world" according to the wishes of the Beijing leaders.

I. It is common knowledge that the Chinese People's Liberation Army is originally a revolutionary one which came into being and grew up during the national democratic revolution in China. This army kept up its characteristic for some time after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 until the mid-fifties when marxism-leninism still played a predominant role in the Chinese Communist Party policy. However, in the late fifties and early sixties when maoism gained the upper hand in the CCP, the Chinese army's nature was gradually changed. It was used in repressing the masses in the country and in the power dispute among various factions. It was employed to promote expansionism and to invade and occupy the territory of some neighboring countries in the 1959-1962 period.

Naturally, the Chinese army's degradation created, developed and intensified the factors of an overall and protracted crisis. For more than 10 years under the "Great Cultural Revolution" which was actually Mao Zedong's counterrevolutionary coup aimed at smashing the CCP, the Chinese army was dragged into a state of complete confusion and was lured by antagonistic factions which took advantage of it to oppose one another. Many bloody armed conflicts occurred among these factions, sometimes involving entire divisions with the participation of the air force and artillery. Scores of millions of people from the president of the state to the common people including more than 400,000 army cadres at various levels were hunted down, intimidated and persecuted as recently admitted by the Beijing press.

At Mao Zedong's death, the "gang of four" was overthrown and the "Great Cultural Revolution" declared ended to pave the way for a period of "great administration" [dqaij trij]. Rumor had it that the Chinese army would also be gradually "stabilized." However, shortly after coming to power, the new Beijing leaders have frantically implemented their global counterrevolutionary strategy and stepped up their four modernizations undertaking under the "Second Long March" label; as a result, the Chinese army's crisis has developed comprehen.ively and actuely, with many characteristics different from the past. This crisis originates in the foolish expansionist ambitions and brazenly traitorous acts of the Beijing leaders--who are more maoist than Mao himself--during the "post-Mao era" and stems directly from the "military modernization" policy designed to intensively modernize the Chinese army.

To rapidly turn China into a military superpower and to carry out its global counterrevolutionary strategy in the hope of achieving world domination, the Beijing ruling clique badly needs a "world champion" army. The "military modernization policy" set forth by Beijing is essentially aimed at "kneading and reshaping" the Chinese army from all points of view--politics, ideology, organization, staff, technical equipment, military concept and combat art--in order to really transform it into a modern aggressive army built in the fashion of the imperialist countries' armies. Such is the basic guideline for the Chinese army's "modernization" as demonstrated by numerous documents and official statements by Beijing and by many actual facts over the recent past. They consider the armed forces of the Soviet Union, Vietnam and other genuine socialist countries as the principal combat targets, U.S. imperialism, NATO and Japan as allies and support points on which to carry out modernization, and the aggressive reactionary armed forces of imperialism as friends "to learn from"...The implementation of many new policies has been initiated in the military field. A strategic research institute has been built with the "help" of American, Japanese and French military specialists. U.S. high-ranking officers have been invited to come and train the Chinese troops for a long term. Japanese and French military delegations have been invited to come and visit military installations and to contribute views on army organization, building and training. Western modern weapons and equipment have been bought urgently. New regulations have been enacted concerning the officers' service system, a change in military uniforms and so forth. All these acts are aimed at gradually transforming the Chinese army into a counterrevolutionary one strong enough to assume the function of an "Eastern NATO" army.

The (long-standing) political deviation of the Chinese army has been manifested more clearly than ever. According to western sources, the Chinese army has been used in increasingly large numbers to repress the masses. In the Beijing capital city alone, the authorities sometimes had to mobilize several divisions to repress the masses and hundreds of schools in this city were reportedly the object of repressive activities by the army and police. In December 1979, a large number of Chinese troops were mobilized

to suppress a "troublemaking" mass movement in 14 provinces and cities out of a total of 29 in the whole country. During the same period of time, scores of thousands of officers directly organized and waged a genocidal war in Kampuchea and a war of aggression on Vietnam's southwest border, trained the armies of Zaire and Somalia and acted as advisers and commanders for the U.S. lackey rebels in Angola and so forth. More typical was the fact that on 17 February 1979, 600,000 Chinese troops were mobilized to carry out a war of aggression against Vietnam. Does this serious event mark the beginning of a period when the Chinese reactionaries and traitors will openly discard their revolutionary mask and use the Chinese army to directly launch a large-scale war of aggression?

Obviously, the function, political mission and combat objectives of the Chinese armed forces have changed completely. This has also naturally and completely changed the relationships between officers and soldiers and between the army and the people--relationships which formerly were a politico-moral factor constituting the strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army when it still was a revolutionary one. The masses of soldiers in the Chinese army are today faced with a large politico-ideological gap. In their eyes, the "Mao Zedong idol" which was once considered as the soul of the people's liberation troops has collapsed. They continue to be used by the rulers to suppress the Chinese laboring people who are exhaustively exploited by the so-called four modernizations. This harsh fact of life has certainly affected the soldiers of the Chinese army although it has been strenuously hidden by the ruling clique.

Beijing has also taken measures to fill in the moral gap in its army by arousing great-nation bigotry to push its troops to readily commit any crime and to blindly go and die. It has raised the "fight to defend modernization" and "fight against hegemony" labels which actually mean opposition to the Soviet Union, Vietnam, national independence, socialism and the world revolutionary movement. The genocidal war crimes perpetrated by the Chinese henchmen and "advisers" in Kampuchea and by the Chinese troops themselves in the war of aggression on the northern border of Vietnam show that, through these acts and under specific conditions, the Beijing militarists have managed to transform a large number of Chinese soldiers into extremely barbarous murderers who will dash into death just like mayflies. This does not, however, demonstrate in the least that this expansionist and aggressive army "has a high combat spirit" or is "stable politically and ideologically" as claimed by the Beijing propaganda apparatus.

In reality, this army is still divided into many clans and controlled by antagonistic factions. The "reversal of verdicts and correction of mistakes" and the "reinstatement" of many army cadres purged during the "Cultural Revolution" are making the situation more complex and confused. It is impossible for the victims of such "undeserved sentences and false trials" to become reconciled "for the sake of unity and stability" with the culprits who formerly ordered their dismissal and imprisonment and who are now haughtily holding positions superior to theirs.

A factor that has further intensified the political, moral and organizational crisis in the Chinese army is precisely the war of aggression against Vietnam in early 1979 and the bitter defeat of Beijing in this war. Even before the end of this war, along with the mass demonstrations taking place in a number of areas against the war of aggression in Vietnam, instances of desertion and antiwar spirit on receiving order to go and attack Vietnam occurred in the Chinese army. New changes have ever since happened to the internal situation of the Chinese army. Recently, numerous developments connected with "new internal purges" have occurred and "fierce feudalistic armed conflicts among different factions" have taken place (AFP 23 December 1979). Sarcastic and lengthy disputed have broken out right in the Beijing Central Military Party Committee over the defeat suffered in the war of aggression against Vietnam.

II. The crisis in the Beijing expansionists' army is clearly reflected in a crisis of military concept and science which is illustrated by various campaigns called "struggle to inherit and creatively develop Mao Zedong's military thought in accordance with the new conditions"!

Most obvious is the fact that Mao Zedong's military thought is being critizized as too outmoded and incapable of meeting the demands of modern warfare. The campaign which has been broadly launched in the Beijing army allegedly to "actively liberate thought and thoroughly apply the spirit" and "to use practice to verify the truth" is aimed at eliminating the bulk of Mao Zedong Thought in the military domain though Mao Zedong is still extolled as "a great proletarian militaryman" in official statements (Zi Xiangjian, RED FLAG, October 1979). On 22 October 1979, the PEOPLE'S DAILY reported that the 5th course organized by the Chinese army general staff for the benefit of cadres at the division level had to debate the question of "criteria of the truth" and to determine "a scientific attitude" (!) toward the "revolutionary leader and theory." The newspaper article said that "the thought of a number of comrades has not yet been changed completely though the debate on the criteria of the truth has been going on for more than a year." Evidently, they have been obliged to openly admit the military thought confusion among high-ranking cadres of the Chinese army.

To date, the news articles and documents published by the foreign and even the Chinese press have revealed that pretty many subject-matters contained in Mao Zedong's military thought have been rejected in different ways, without, however, failing to bring about a reaction in some segment of the body of army cadres. A conspicuous cause of this state of affairs can be found in the history of the Chinese army most general and leaders of which came from and "matured" in the guerrilla, liberation and civil wars; a number of them did participate in the Korean war which was a modern one but which happened nearly a third of a century ago. Their basic military backgrounds were based on Mao Tsetung's military thought and the achievements scored by them in the army were linked to Mao Zedong's leadership.

Consequently, it is not easy to criticize Mao's military thought because to do so is tacitly to nullify the military knowledge of an entire generation of old generals and hence their positions and competence.

The criticism and rejection of many subject-matters concerning Mao's thought and theories have been further intensified in the military sphere only after the defeat in the war of aggression against Vietnam. The western press has noted that "after the February (1979) aggression against Vietnam, the Chinese armed forces have been expressly ordered" "to modernize their tactics and discard military concepts based on Mao Zedong's military thought" (THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 9 November 1979). Ever since, the Chinese military research organs have actively "recapitulated modern warfare experiences: and used the "practical" effects of this defeat to "verify the truth" and to continue to reject many aspects of Mao Zedong's military thought. Many documents drawn and "recapitulated" from this war are being disseminated among military schools. At the inauguration of a training school, Jiang Weiqing, political officer of the Foochow Great Military Region, stressed the need to study "experiences" drawn from this defeat. Addressing the students most of whom had participated in the war of aggression against Vietnam, he said: "Though you have not yet fought against a highly modernized army, that war (the February 1979 war of aggression against Vietnam) looked more like a modern war than the wars we fought in the past. Your experiences are very precious." The western press has also disclosed that a single infantry school in this large military region has "recruited an additional 1,600 students of whom 1,100 participated in the February 1979 campaign against Vietnam" (THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 9 November 1979).

It can be said that the military concept crisis in the Chinese army is the synthesis of numerous factors including political and technical ones. From the political point of view, the crisis stems from the conversion of a revolutionary army into an aggressive one. In the technical field, the crisis is caused by the demand placed on an army constituted mainly by infantry units formed during a guerrilla war to grow into an army with different branches of service fit for modern warfare. That is evident proof of the Beijing expansionists' gloomy schemes to prepare for a modern type of war of aggression against the revolutionary movement in other countries. The modification or repudiation of any point in Mao's military thought is merely aimed at making the Chinese army suitable for such wars of aggression. Let alone the private political motives of the antagonistic factions which, however, have to stand on a common land of the expansionist doctrine--if one studies the military science in its purity, one will find that this crisis is an extremely complex problem. There is a need to throw away "old things" because they are "incompatible with modernization." Since they are under "study", "novelties" cannot be promptly introduced. Moreover, a very strong conservatism still exists in an army burdened with the peasants' characteristics and a low cultural standard... All these things are causing a headache to the Beijing reactionary leaders.

While buying western weapons and technology to modernize their army and while organizing new units, the Beijing leaders are continuing to import the imperialist military theory and science under the label of "trying to learn from the world progressive experiences," "to combine the quintessences of the eastern and western military sciences," and "to study ways to build the army under modern conditions"...In October 1979, Yang Yung deputy chief of general staff of the Chinese army, called on high-ranking officers to "exert every effort to study modern strategy, tactics and military techniquue and to endow themselves with a modern culture and military science." Over the past year, hundreds of military specialists and adviser from the U.S., French and Japanese military schools and research institutes have been invited to Beijing to "cooperate" in this matter. A strategic research institute has recently been founded in Beijing under the direction of Yu Xinquan and with the cooperation of U.S. military specialists. Many military science documents from the imperialist countries are being studied and consulted in the drawing up of new curricula on regulations and statutes and in the compliation of military textbooks. According to U.S. sources, U.S. officers "will assume military training" in China (VOA, 10 January 1980). During his Peking trip in early January 1980, U.S. Secretary of Defense Brown declared that "military exchange between the two countries will be broadened during a relatively long period of time, including lectures on military topics to be given by high-ranking officers" (UPI, 9 January 1980). It can be said that the Sino-U.S. military alliance has come into being. The increasingly deep instillation of the western military science into the Chinese army at the present time proves that Beijing's voluntary assumption of the role of an "Eastern NATO" is clearly not only a political slogan but also a guideline for actual military action.

Naturally, the combination of the military thought of Mao with that of the West--both replete with antagonistic factors--will give rise to numerous contradictions within the military theory of the Beijing expansionist doctrine, not to speak of the imperialist military science itself which has come to a deadlock and suffered a crisis on many basic topics over the past 10 years, especially since the U.S. imperialists' defeat in Vietnam.

The "change of the old for the new" in the Beijing military theory has also dealt a serious blow to the body of military science cadres in the Chinese army. These cadres have always had insufficient qualifications and were miserably disturbed by the "Cultural Revolution." Today they are looked on as persons with "rigid thoughts because of an excessive belief in Mao's quotations" (THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 9 November 1979). Faced with the western military science and the requirements of modern warfare, this old generation also feels that they are no less "novice" than the younger generations who are undergoing urgent training.

The crisis of politics, ideology, organization and military concept and science in the Chinese army is part of an overall crisis encompassing China in its entirety. This is a general crisis of Maoism in the "post-Mao era" when the Beijing reactionary authorities are rushing headlong on

a reactionary and traitorous path in collusion with imperialism to oppose the world revolutionary movement. This is further proof that China is large but not strong, that the Chinese aggressive army has a great numerical strength but is afflicted with very basic weaknesses and that it will take a long time to contemplate growing into as modern and well-trained an army as those of the imperialist aggressors. As for imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism, it is also playing he "Chinese card" in an attempt to motivate and aid Beijing in the field of military modernization with the hope of using the "human wave" army as an assault force for the benefit of the U.S. global strategy in Asia. This "devilish alliance" of people who are "apparently one but widely different in outlooks" is posing a serious threat to world peace and may complicate the situation in certain areas. But both have been defeated in battle and have very basic, insurmountable weaknesses.

By continuously heightening vigilance, our army and people will certainly deal more appropriate blows to the Beijing expansionists should they recklessly launch another war of aggression against our fatherland.

9332
CSO: 4209

1968, BILATERAL CEMA GENERAL DELIVERY CONDITIONS COMPARED

Hanoi NGOAI THUONG [FOREIGN TRADE] in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 79 pp 30-34

[Professional and Technical Matters column by Ha Hien Hoang: "Comparison of Major Clauses in 1968-1975 CEMA General Conditions of Delivery and Bilateral General Conditions of Delivery"]

[Text] In June 1978 our country became a member of CEMA. The CEMA General Conditions of Delivery (from here on abbreviated as 1968-75 CEMA GCD) now in force in member countries will sooner or later be applied to the trade relations between our country's and the fraternal countries' foreign trade organizations. However, prior to that we will be able to sign with CEMA a protocol to revise the points which we find unsuitable for our country's characteristics.

To find such points, in our opinion, a significant thing to do first is to compare the 1968-75 CEMA GCD with the bilateral General Conditions of Delivery (from here on abbreviated as GCD) and the realities that have been existing in the trade between our country and the fraternal socialist countries so as to draw the points which we must think over in connection with application of the multilateral GCD.

Here we make an initial comparison of some major clauses in the 1968-75 CEMA GCD with the bilateral GCD's and the realities resulting from them and offer some initial recommendations as to their application.

Here are some major points resulting from our initial comparison:

I - About Signing of Contracts

In the clauses about this subject, the 1968-75 CEMA GCD further clarifies a number of concepts that the GCD's do not mention but must be determined in international trade, such as:

- The terms about contract signing include both orders and offers; the terms about proposal accepting include acceptance of both orders and offers (clause 1, item 4).

- Acceptance of proposal but with reservation or after the end of the period in which the proposal is good acceptance of this proposal as a new one (clause 1, item 2).

The 1968-75 CEMA GCD also unifies some of the points that are not unified in the GCD's. For instance:

- About the period in which the proposal of contract signing is good in case this document does not specify any deadline for an answer, while the GCD signed with Poland specifies 30 days from the date of sending, the GCD's signed with the GDR and Cuba 45 days from the date of sending and the GCD's signed with Hungary and Romania 30 days from the date of receipt, the multilateral GCD makes a unified condition of 30 days from the date of sending of offer.

- About the letters and correspondence prior to the signing of contracts, the bilateral GCD's signed with Bulgaria, Korea and Czechoslovakia do not mention the end of their validity, but now it is specified as a unified condition that their validity ends after contracts have been signed.

To avoid any conflict that may arise about drafting of contracts, the multilateral GCD also indicates that if a notice of acceptance of proposal is received late but with the knowledge that it has been sent before the specified deadline, this notice is considered late only if the party havoffered the proposal immediately calls the other party about receiving this late notice.

As compared with the clauses in the bilateral GCD's, the multilateral GCD does not contain legal rules about the language and contents of contracts, who are to sign them and who are to pay for the costs of altering them. Therefore, sellers and buyers are free to agree on this matter. They can also apply the international commercial habits to resolve any conflict that may arise (for instance about costs, revision of contracts).

As to the language of contracts mentioned in the GCD's signed with Poland, Bulgaria, the GDR, Mongolia and Korea, contracts must be written in the two languages of the signatories and translated into a third language (such as French, Russian, etc.). But in the actual trade relations in the past 20 years between our foreign trade organizations and those countries, contracts have always been written in a single language and there have been no conflicts in regard to the language of contracts.

As to the contents of contracts, the actual commercial practice of the past years has indicated that contracts must have a number of specific clauses in addition to the one about the subject of contract and the main clauses. For example, the title and date of the agreement serving as the basis for signing the contract, the number of item in the list of goods as specified in an agreement, etc. The lack of such clauses will make it difficult for the parties concerned to monitor the implementation of this agreement.

Positive instructions must therefore be given to foreign trade organizations about this matter, if not by signing protocols supplementing the GCD's then possibly by issuing a directive from the Ministry of Foreign Trade allowing organizations to sign foreign trade contracts. About the contract signing process, as compared with the GCD's, the 1968-75 CEMA GCD thus contains the provisions that either clarify or unify the legal rules, or suggest new legal rules in order to avoid litigation between the signatories. However, there are some necessary rules that have not yet been suggested (for instance, the question of main contents of contracts, costs resulting from changing contracts and validity of contracts signed prior to the annual protocols, which are shortcomings that must be overcome).

II - About Basic Delivery Conditions

In the case goods are transported by train, like the bilateral GCD's, the 1968-75 CEMA GCD states the delivery condition as "free of charge by rail to a border station in the seller's country." The multilateral GCD does not specify any exceptions.

In the case goods are transported by sea, according to the 1968-75 CEMA GCD, the parties deliver goods either F.O.B., with additional agreement about the costs involving arrangement of goods and cushioning and padding, or C.I.F. or C.F.; the 1968-75 CEMA GCD does not make a distinction between countries but rather between the obligation of sellers and that of buyers.

According to the GCD signed with Bulgaria, the goods from Bulgaria will be delivered C.I.F. (clause 4) to Vietnam, which can ask Bulgaria to charter ships and to buy insurance for it.

Among the less positive rules, we need to mention clause 1 of the GCD signed with the Soviet Union, which deals with "the risks involving the goods transferred from sellers to buyers since the goods are put on board."

In the case goods are transported by air, the only basic delivery condition mentioned in the 1968-75 CEMA GCD is "free of charge at point of delivery to the air organization." This is a much more rational condition than the ones in some bilateral GCD's, such as:

- Free of charge delivery to an airport in the sellers' country (the GCD's signed with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia).

In the case goods are delievered through the postal service, according to the 1968-75 CEMA GCD, the basic delivery condition is "free of charge delivery to the sendees' address," with the costs of transportation being paid by sellers. This condition is suitable for the shipping of goods through the posts and telegraph, unlike the conditions specified in the GCD's signed with the Soviet Union (sellers pay for postal charges within their own country) and with Korea (buyers pay postal charges).

Since a larger number of CEMA member nations are close to one another, trucks receive greater attention in foreign trade transportation than we used to think about. Consequently, the basic condition for delivery of goods by truck is detailed quite lengthily in the 1968-75 CEMA GCD. Do we need to consider this condition in order to apply it to the trade between our country and the People's Republic of Laos and the People's Republic of Kampuchea?

As compared with the bilateral GCD's, the regulations about the basic delivery condition contained in the 1968-75 CEMA GCD are both unified and more appropriate and flexible. On the other hand, the 1968-75 CEMA GCD still allows the parties concerned to choose and apply one of the delivery conditions, namely F.O.B., C.I.F. or C.F. (clause 7, item 1); at the same time, they can flexibly agree that "sellers bear the costs of bringing goods into the ship's cargo bins, including the goods-loading charge" (clause 7, item 2) and "agree to let a certain party bear the costs of cushioning and padding materials" (clause 7, item 4).

III - About Time of Delivery

In this chapter, the 1968-75 CEMA GCD contains two rules that are newer as compared with the bilateral GCD's. These are the rules mentioned in clause 11 and clause 11A.

According to clause 11, if the contracts do not include any other agreement, when delivery involves large quantities in separate lots, the goods are to be delivered at regular intervals within the specified time.

According to clause 11A, the parties can sign time setting contracts.

In addition, the 1968-75 CEMA GCD further clarifies the bilateral GCD's in regard to the right of sellers to prolong the time of delivery in an appropriate manner when buyers fail to fulfill the obligation they have accepted that would ensure sellers' production. The bilateral GCD's simply say no. But the multilateral GCD asserts that, however, "sellers cannot excessively prolong delivery time as compared with buyers' delay in fulfilling the above-mentioned obligation, or sellers can claim payment of damages actually caused by that situation" and "in special and technically reasonable cases, the two sides can decide about another technically reasonable time" (clause 13).

According to clause 14 of the 1968-75 CEMA GCD, the date of delivery of complete equipment is the date of delivery of the last component, the lack of which renders the equipment inoperable. Thus the multilateral GCD currently in force has not yet linked the responsibility for supplying technical documents with the responsibility for delivering machinery and equipment in time. This is very important, particularly for the complete equipment that can be operated separately and requires technical documents to be operated. Therefore, we wonder whether we should revise the clause

as follows: in the case of equipment that can be operated separately, the date of delivery of its last component along with the technical documents, the lack of which will render the equipment inoperable, is considered the goods delivery date.

IV - About Quality of Goods

As we know, quality is a part of the objective of a contract. But in reality, in many cases the parties concerned do not clearly indicate their quality needs. Consequently, to make contract signing easy and convenient the GCD's must resolve this matter. However, it may sometimes be disadvantageous for one side:

- Sellers deliver goods in accordance with the standards of their own country (the GCD's signed with the Soviet Union and Korea).

- Sellers deliver goods in accordance with their own standards, on the basis of their own quality certificates (the GCD's signed with Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia).

Of the bilateral GCD's only five -- the ones signed with Romania, Poland, Cuba, the GDR and Mongolia -- contain a relatively rational rule to the effect that "sellers are to deliver the goods having average quality that their country normally delivers for export."

The 1968-75 CEMA GCD states: "If the contract does not specify that the goods must satisfy the particular quality requirements under technical conditions or standards (with the number and date of promulgation of such standards being clearly indicated), or in accordance with the sample to which both sides have agreed, sellers must deliver goods of normal average quality attached to the same kind of goods being normally delivered and in conformity with the uses specified in the contract. If these uses are not indicated in the contract, they must deliver goods of normal average quality and normal uses of the same kind of goods in the sellers' country" (clause 15).

In addition, unlike the bilateral GCD's, the multilateral GCD also sets forth this rule: "While implementing a contract, sellers must notify buyers about any improvements and changes in the manufacture of machinery and equipment, the objective of this contract" (clause 16, item 1).

In short, we think that generally the rules about quality in the 1968-75 CEMA GCD are acceptable ones for us.

V - About Guarantee, Technical Documents

The bilateral GCD's were born while the machinery and equipment trade between our country and the fraternal socialist countries accounted for a very small value. On the contrary, when the 1968-75 CEMA GCD was put into

effect, the CEMA member nations had acquired considerable experience in the equipment trade. As a result, the rules about selling and buying machinery, equipment and long-lasting industrial goods as contained in the 1968-75 CEMA GCD are richer and much more accurate than those in the bilateral GCD's.

As to "technical documents," only five bilateral GCD's signed after the birth of the 1958 CEMA GCD (i.e., those signed with Poland, Cuba, the GDR, Mongolia and Romania) contain the related rules. Meanwhile, in the 1968-75 CEMA GCD, the chapter that deals with this matter plays an appropriate role.

The fact that sellers are late in delivering technical documents normally causes adverse consequences for buyers, which are no less detrimental than late delivery of goods. Consequently, according to the bilateral GCD's signed with Poland, Cuba and Romania, in this case sellers receive some punishment for what they have done -- late delivery of goods for instance. The multilateral GCD also specifies the same level of punishment for this breach, but by its calculating method any late delivery of technical documents followed by a late delivery of machinery or equipment will be considered as continued late delivery of machinery and equipment and get appropriate punishment (clause 81). These two rules can bring about two different consequences. For instance, if a seller delivers machinery 60 days late and after that delivers technical documents 10 more days late, with a fine being imposed for late delivery of goods from the 31st day on, the fine will be only 3.8 percent (= .05% x 30 days + .05% x 30 days + .08% x 10 days) by the first method and 5.1 percent (= .05% x 30 days + .08% x 30 days + .12% x 10 days) by the second method of computing the percentage of fines.

About "guarantee" the bilateral GCD's signed with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Korea do not contain any related rules; the ones signed with Albania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia only mention in a generalized way that machinery and equipment will be guaranteed within the period of time specified in the contracts.

As compared with the "guarantee" chapters in the GCD's signed with Poland, Cuba, the GDR, Mongolia and Romania, the 1968-75 CEMA GCD contains a number of new rules.

In the bilateral GCD's, the guarantee of complete equipment is similar to that of other equipment and machines. But in reality, with regard to complete equipment, the need for a guarantee of quality does not involve only the quality of raw materials, structure and level of processing, but it is reflected in other targets like productivity, planning capacity, level of consumption of raw materials and electric power, etc. Consequently, the 1968-75 CEMA GCD is more realistic as it clearly states that "the extent of and conditions for a guarantee of the economic and technical indices of the entire plant and complete equipment must be determined by agreement between the two sides or by contract" (clause 28, item 2).

The bilateral GCD's also lack the rules about guaranteeing parts. But according to the multilateral GCD, the guarantee for replacement parts delivered along with equipment will end with the guarantee for the latter (clause 36), while the guarantee for the parts that replace the broken ones will be decided on the basis of actual international consultations (clause 38). And, as we know, there are two ways to resolve the question of guarantee for parts delivered as replacement parts: either their guarantee ends at the same time as the guarantee for equipment or the guarantee for equipment depends on the duration of their guarantee.

As to the replacement parts that wear out quickly, according to the 1968-75 CEMA GCD, their guarantee will be decided on the basis of bilateral agreement, with actual international consultations. More particularly, for this kind of parts, if contracts do not specify otherwise, sellers by request of buyers must supply for the entire duration of the guarantee enough parts to ensure a normal level of use of equipment.

If within the guarantee period the goods are found to be untrue to the contract terms, according to the bilateral GCD's buyers can ask sellers to correct the defects of their goods in time. But according to the 1968-75 CEMA GCD, in this case buyers can either ask for the same or demand a reduction of prices. Sellers can then choose the way to resolve the matter suitable for them.

Besides the above rules, the multilateral GCD also points to the way to handle the dealings between the parties concerned after the defects of the guaranteed goods have been corrected. According to it, the defective goods or defective parts that have been replaced must be returned to the selling party no later than 6 months from the date the buying party received a request for their return. However, the selling party cannot create difficulties for the buying party with respect to the storage and keeping of the defective parts. Consequently, the selling party must request the return of these goods or parts within 6 months (12 months for complete equipment) from the date of delivery of replacement goods. Beyond this period, the selling party will lose the right to seek arbitration.

About the guarantee period, in addition to the periods that are uniformly applicable to the European socialist countries, the 1968-75 CEMA GCD also rules in a very rational manner that these periods are extended by 2 months in the case of Mongolia and Cuba. The reason this rule is rational is that it does consider the time necessary for the transfer of goods from the exporting country to the importing country. In our case, we think that we will have a good reason to ask CEMA to extend the guarantee period for the goods delivered to Vietnam. The period of guarantee for the goods delivered to Vietnam must be from 2 to 2½ months longer than the guarantee period specified in the multilateral GCD.

As compared with the "guarantee" and "technical documents" clauses in the bilateral GCD's, the 1968-75 CEMA GCD thus contains many new rules that closely link the responsibilities of exporters with normal use of goods

and quality of goods within the guarantee period. However, as we implement this CCD, we need to and can request extension of the guarantee period to compensate for the distance in space between our country and the great majority of the present CEMA member nations.

At the same time, because of our country's geographical location and special climate, the question of guaranteeing equipment for use under tropical conditions also needs to be raised within the responsibilities of sellers for guarantee or quality of goods.

In addition, there are other questions about guaranteeing complete equipment, such as guaranteeing the correctness of planning, guaranteeing the rate of fuel consumption, guaranteeing output of complete equipment delivered by many sellers, etc.

5598
CSO: 4209

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

MEASURES TO ENSURE CORRECT ISSUANCE OF PARTY CARDS RECOMMENDED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 2, Feb 80 pp 60-64

[Article by Le Tat Thang: "A Basic Problem of Decisive Significance in the Issuance of Party Membership Cards"]

[Text] The issuance of party membership cards throughout the party is a major event marking a further step of our party toward maturity and is also an important task of a profound and manifold significance which helps indoctrinate party members and raise their spirit of revolutionary struggle, organization, discipline and internal unity, which promotes the conduct of the movement to build a stable, strong and wholesome party and which simultaneously puts party members' management into the right track and prevents party infiltration by the enemy and bad elements.

Begun in 1980, the issuance of party membership cards is a regular work of the party. To satisfactorily carry out this issuance, each party organization must tackle many jobs but must consider it of paramount importance to examine party membership qualifications, to correctly determine which party members are qualified or unqualified and, on this basis, to provide intensive indoctrination in the viewpoint, ideology, qualities, ethics and capacities proper to party members in order to make each and everyone of them worthy of the name and role of vanguard combatant for the revolutionary cause.

Examining party membership qualifications is a decisive basic task aimed at achieving the objectives of the issuance of party membership cards and is also an important measure affecting many aspects of the party building activities.

The directive of the Party Central Committee Secretariat states that party membership cards shall be granted only to persons fully qualified as party members. It is absolutely necessary to prevent the issuance of party membership cards to unqualified persons and, conversely, to avoid withholding party cards from qualified party members. To deliver a party membership card is tantamount to assigning a new struggle duty

to the party member. This act confers a great honor on the party member and is simultaneously a confirmation of his sufficient party membership qualifications.

The result of the issuance of party membership cards in each party organization depends on the way the examination of party membership qualifications is carried out. If this examination is done correctly and satisfactorily, it will constitute the most important factor determining the result of the issuance of party membership cards.

The problem of party members plays a highly important role in the whole system of principles governing the building of a new-type political party of the working class and party membership qualifications are a very basic question in this major problem. Therefore, our party constantly takes care to improve and heighten party membership qualifications. The issuance of party membership cards is a measure taken to induce all party members to examine their own membership qualifications and also to motivate all party organizations to regularly and carefully improve their cadre contingents.

If the examination of party membership qualifications is done correctly and satisfactorily, it will have a profound educational effect on party members by enabling them to realize their responsibility and honor more clearly, to keep up and develop the existing positive factors and to overcome and prevent negative manifestations contrary to party membership qualifications. To examine party membership qualifications is to create a very good condition for strengthening primary party organizations, for making party chapters stable, strong and wholesome without the presence of unqualified party members and for enabling party organizations to better know each and every party member and manage them more completely and closely and also to grasp party membership qualifications more firmly to promote party development and heighten the quality of this task. The examination of party membership qualifications also offers an opportunity to strengthen the close relationships between party organizations and party members, on the one hand, and the broad masses, on the other, so that the latter may positively contribute to building the party, enthusiastically criticize and help party members and eagerly recommend prominent persons to party chapters; it is also an occasion to wipe out and stop the acts of any party member or cadre which violate the masses' right to collective ownership.

The better the examination of party membership qualifications is carried out in primary party organizations within the Party Organization in the army, the greater influence it will have not only on the issuance of party membership cards and the building of the Party Organization but also on the improvement of the political and overall quality of troops and on an increase in the leadership and combat strength of units, thereby positively contributing to the fulfillment of the political task of these units.

Party membership qualifications are a basic condition to be fulfilled by party members and are essential to the accomplishment of their duties;

only by accomplishing their duties as party members are they fully qualified for party membership.

Party membership qualifications stem from the class nature, vanguard role and historic mission of the party and from the traditions developed and the experiences gained by it during the past stage and are also based on the revolutionary situation and mission in the new stage.

The recapitulative report on party building and party statute amendments submitted at the Fourth Party Congress has presented the following basic viewpoints on party membership qualifications:

According to President Ho's advice, party members must be the "leaders" and simultaneously the "loyal servants" of the people.

Party members must be persons who are enlightened by the communist ideal, who are absolutely faithful to the revolution, who voluntarily pledge to devote their whole lives to making sacrifices and to struggling for the independence and freedom of the fatherland and for socialism and communism... In addition to a fixed degree of knowledge of marxist-leninist theories, party members must be able to grasp party lines and policies, to undertake the assigned tasks and to lead the masses and must contribute to the leadership exercised by party organizations, continuously study and eagerly train themselves from all points of view...

Party members must respect the system of collective ownership of the laboring people, help build it, maintain close relationships with the masses and satisfactorily carry out propaganda and mass motivation and organization...

Party members must take care to build the party, have a sense of organization, discipline, self-criticism and criticism and safeguard the party and its unity and uniformity...

Party members must display a high porletarian internationalism and contribute to the party's fulfillment of its international obligations...

Based on the abovementioned viewpoints on party membership qualifications, the party statute has clearly defined five duties of party members. These duties are compatible with party membership qualifications--the basic conditions required of party members. Only by fulfilling his duties can a party member be considered fully qualified. Therefore, the examination of party membership qualifications must always be linked to the inspection of the way party members carry out their duties.

In examining party membership qualifications, it is also necessary to consider the characteristics and tasks of the organization in which a party member is carrying out activities in order to apply principles specifically, appropriately and realistically. In examining party membership qualifications, party organizations in the army must naturally pay attention

to and lay emphasis on the combat spirit, combat readiness and combat performance, the building and fighting task of the army, the responsibilities to units and the masses, the sense of organization and discipline, the implementation of directives, orders, regulations and systems proper to a regular army, and the efforts to improve the knowledge of modern military science and to master weapons, equipment and technology...

Party membership qualifications also include the party members' fulfillment of their specific functions and tasks since each of them is always entrusted with some definite mission or task. A party member's qualifications and duties are usually reflected mostly in the execution of the function and mission entrusted to him. Only by accomplishing such function and mission can he meet the most important requirement of party membership qualifications. If he fails to fulfill the function and mission entrusted --that is, if he is inferior to the masses outside the party from a very fundamental point of view--, how can he be considered qualified as a revolutionary vanguard of the working class? Of course, prior to concluding that a party member has failed to fulfill his function and mission, it is necessary to carefully analyze the situation, to find out the true reasons for his failure and to determine whether it is caused mainly by objective or subjective circumstances...

It is possible that qualified party members still have some shortcomings and make mistakes but these imperfections must neither be serious nor impair their characteristics as party members; nevertheless, they must meet the basic requirements of party membership qualifications. A party member's qualifications must also be manifested right in his attitude toward his own errors and shortcomings.

It can be said that the distinction between meeting and lacking party membership qualifications is whether a party member is more progressive than the masses outside the party in terms of political awareness and revolutionary acts and whether he is trusted and accepted by the collective body of party members and by the broad masses.

The responsibility for proceeding with the examination of party membership qualifications lies not only with party organizations at various levels but mainly with each and every party member and even with the masses outside the party.

Since the examination of party membership qualifications is a sharp educational measure applied to party members and is also an organizational one aimed at building the party, it must be carried out carefully and strictly by taking extensive and intensive steps not only through propaganda, indoctrination, self-criticism and criticism but also by holding debates, reaching conclusions and carrying out votes, confirmations, investigations and ratifications. Perfunctoriness, reliance on others and entrusting entire jobs to someone else are all inadvisable.

The examination of party membership qualifications is first a responsibility of each party member. A party member must have a high degree of self-conciousness and a serious self-critical spirit and must clearly realize the requirements of party membership qualifications and the meaning of the examination of these qualifications in order to be able to examine himself and determine whether he is qualified or unqualified for party membership; moreover, he must fully understand the need to strengthen primary party organizations and must boldly criticize and struggle, distinguish right from wrong and good from bad and express clear-cut views on the qualifications of each party member in the party chapter. No matter whatever and wherever the position and task of a party member are, his membership qualifications must be examined and assessed at the party chapter where he is carrying out activities. If all party members are correct is assessing themselves and in carrying out the vote, this will mostly ensure the accuracy of the examination of party membership qualifications and the soundness of the issuance of party membership cards.

Since party chapters and party committees at all levels are directly responsible for the issuance of party membership cards, they must carry out the examination of party membership qualifications directly, carefully and strictly. Each level of the Party Organization in the army--from party chapters and party committees at the grassroots level to party committees in regiments (a level higher than primary organizations) and in military regions, military corps and various branches of service (and equivalents)--has a different mission and competence but all levels are highly responsible for the examination of party membership qualifications which involves the following tasks: analysis, conclusions and votes in primary organizations and inspection, confirmation and ratification by levels higher than the primary organizations. It is necessary to grasp the principle that it is the duty of collectives to examine party membership qualifications and to make decisions. In the primary organizations, these collectives are the entire party chapters and party committees at the grassroots level; at the levels higher than the primary organizations, these collectives are the standing committees of party committees. Party committees at various echelons and their standing committees, secretaries and deputy secretaries are primarily and mostly responsible for preventing errors and omissions such as those committed in the case of persons who are qualified for party membership but are denied party cards and in the case of unqualified persons who are issued with party cards.

The masses outside the party play a very important role in examining party membership qualifications because every party member lives and carries out activities among the masses and because the masses are usually fully aware of the good points and defects of party members. The masses can realistically contribute to the building of the party and express their views and feelings about the party by frankly and boldly criticizing and helping party members, by revealing unqualified ones and making relevant proposals. By making the masses clearly understand the meaning of the examination of party membership qualifications and of the issuance of party membership

cards and by satisfactorily organizing the collection of the masses' opinion of party members, party chapters will make an important contribution to a clear-cut and correct conclusion that which party members are qualified and must be issued with party cards, that the case of which party members must be further examined and that which ones have failed to meet party membership qualifications and must immediately be expelled from the party. The voice of the masses has not only a constructive effect on all party chapters and party members but also often has a decisive significance with regard to the sound conclusions drawn and the correct votes carried out by party chapters and committees at different levels concerning the need to carefully examine the qualifications of certain party members, and with regard to the consolidation of primary party organizations to make them stable, strong and wholesome.

The examination of party membership qualifications does not end with the issuance of party membership cards. The acceptance and keeping of the party membership card involves a struggle by each party member to firmly maintain his qualifications and also requires party organizations at all levels to verify and examine the party members' qualifications. It can be said that since the party membership card is a symbol and a confirmation of party membership qualifications, a party member--who has pledged to spend his lifetime struggling for the revolutionary cause of the party and people and who wants to keep his party membership card for life--must try all his life to meet the requirements of party membership qualifications.

9332
CSO: 4209

DETAILS OF DIRECTIVE ON 1980 STATE PLAN DRAFTING PUBLISHED

Hanoi TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA [PLANNING REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 79 pp 6-9

[Excerpt from Directive No 187, dated 17 May 1979, of the Council of Ministers: "Concentrate on Guiding Drafting of the 1980 State Plan"]

[Text] The 1980 state plan is extremely important, for it is the last annual plan for the fulfillment of the 1976-1980 five-year plan and prepares the way for the third five-year plan (1981-1985). The drafting of the 1980 state plan must be in correct accordance with the requirement of "truly transforming planning, with regard to both contents and methods," set forth in the resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee. The basic direction in transforming planning is to, on the basis of labor, land, forests, seas, and the other means of production, exploit all of the latent capabilities and advance to resolving by ourselves the urgent problems which we are capable of resolving. We must expand the right of the bases, localities, and sectors to take the initiative in drafting their own plans, do a good job of drafting state plans from the base level and district level on up, and overcome the situations of bureaucratic centralization, even dispersion, and lack of a sense of responsibility in drafting plans and guiding plan implementation. We must manifest the party's economic policies in the form of good economic-technical plans, be concerned with the economic effectiveness of plans and, gradually overcome overly centralized administration in management. It is necessary to do a good job of applying the method of planning according to norms and standards, complete programs with objectives, the balancing of sectors, etc., and boldly utilize economic accounting and electronic computers in calculating plans.

That amounts to a complete transformation with regard to both the contents and methods of planning. It demands that we transform all elements of the economic management system.

The drafting of 1980 state plans by the sectors and echelons must fully reflect the political situation and missions, be closely combined with guidance of the implementation of the 1979 plan, and make good preparations of the third five-year plan (1981-1985), in order to concentrate on meeting the important and urgent objectives, especially with regard to staple food, nonstaple food, consumer goods, and export goods, in order to do a good job of

fulfilling the common missions set forth in the resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party Central Committee:

Promoting production, carrying out socialist transformation, and stabilizing and assuring the people's living conditions.

Strengthening national defense and security and defending the homeland.

Continuing to build the material-technical bases of socialism.

While fulfilling those three missions we must also fulfill our international obligations toward Laos and Kampuchea.

On the basis of the opinions of the Political Bureau regarding the control figures of the 1980 state plan, the sectors and echelons have the mission of concentrating on the good performance of the following tasks.

1. Concentrating guidance on the drafting of base-level and district plans, and resolutely carrying out the synthesizing of state plans from the base and district levels on up.

The drafting and synthesizing of state plans, from the base and district levels on up are important requirements of the transformation of planning and also are urgent measures necessary to strengthen the base level and develop the district level, in order to resolve the extremely great problems of the economy, especially those regarding staple food and nonstaple food, gradually build the districts agricultural-industrial economic structure, create a new socialist countryside, and develop the districts into fortresses which defend the homeland. That is also a way to enable the plans to be based primarily on self-reliance and on our strengths, in order to take initiative in resolving the difficulties in balancing plans and assure that the state plans are both positive and solid. Therefore, all sectors at the central level are responsible for coordinating with the province in giving close guidance and creating favorable conditions for the districts and bases to do a good job of drafting plans.

a. With regard to the plans of the base-level units:

Each production and commercial base must have specific policies and measures to exploit and fully utilize all latent capabilities regarding labor, land, forests, seas, and the other natural resources and the existing production capabilities, in order to promote production, develop sectors and trades, increase labor productivity, and increase production in order to contribute to the state and exports, and improve living conditions.

The state-operated units must, on the basis of the plan control figures assigned by the upper echelon, take the initiative in drafting their all-round plans, and have the right to determine the specific plan balances, recommend goals higher than the control figures, and stress the plans for applying scientific-technical advances to production, maintaining and improving product

quality, increasing labor productivity, lowering production costs, and increasing profits. We must expand the right of the base-level units with regard to the production and circulation of products which the state does not manage or for which it does not provide materials, especially with regard to the products made from domestic raw materials, waste materials, and waste products. With regard to those products, the enterprises include them in their secondary production plans or draft separate plans which clearly state the effectiveness of production in order to organize implementation, while reporting them to the upper echelon for review and supplementation.

On the basis of fulfilling their obligation to pay taxes and sell products to the state (including products for export) in accordance with two-way economic contracts, the collective economic bases have the right to determine the contents of their over-all plans, from setting production norms and achieving balances to carrying out distribution within the cooperatives and determining the level of income in terms in money and in kind, especially the amount of staple food to be consumed by the people.

The base-level units in the areas laid waste by the enemy must, according to the extent of the damage and the dispersion situation, draft specific plans to fulfill the urgent missions regarding the restoration of production and the stabilization of living conditions in the briefest possible time. Attention must be paid to doing a good job of resolving the various problems: cleaning up the surface area, carrying out sanitation, repairing and restoring the damaged installations, providing messing and housing facilities for cadres and workers, reorganizing the production line, redeploying labor, rapidly bringing all workers back to work, and fully utilizing the production forces in order to rapidly resume production and attain the highest output levels.

b. With regard to district-level plans:

The Secretariat of the Party Central Committee and the Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers have issued separate documents to guide the drafting of district-level plans. This directive sets forth their main points.

The districts must guide the villages, cooperatives, and state-operated bases under their jurisdiction in drafting plans, and synthesize the district plan at the base level, while working with the services of the province, the general corporations, and the enterprise combines of the ministries in drafting plans for the enterprises in the district which come under the authority of the province and the central level. By means of the drafting of good plans by the basic units, the district can grasp the capabilities and needs, its advantages and strengths, and the difficulties that must be resolved, in order to balance the plans positively and solidly.

The principal direction of concentration of district-level planning is to endeavor to promote agricultural, forestry, and fishing production, and the

production of industrial consumer goods and exports, the most important objective of which is striving to, within a period of a few years resolving the food problem in order to meet the needs of the local people and increase the level of contribution to the central level. The districts in the Red River and Mekong deltas and in the deltas of the Central region must supply increasingly larger amounts of staple food to the state. The other areas must become self-sufficient in staple food and advance to producing a surplus to contribute to the central level. The districts in the Tay Nguyen region, in eastern Nam Bo, and in the mountain region must pay attention to meeting their staple food needs when developing industrial crops, stock raising, and forestry. They must both practice intensive cultivation and actively clear wasteland in order to expand the acreage, pay attention to both rice and subsidiary food crops, and be concerned with the all-round resolution of the subsidiary food crop problem, from processing to transportation and consumption.

It is necessary to consider in advance the state's capability to meet in 1980 such agricultural needs as fertilizer, insecticides, and a number of other materials (POL, tractor parts, etc.), investment capital, and construction materials, which are in limited supply. Therefore, we must manifest a spirit of revolutionary offensive, and fully utilize the existing labor, land, and machinery, and all other capabilities, to increase acreage, productivity, and output in accordance with the requirements of the economy in the new situation. Furthermore, when drafting plans it is necessary to concentrate capital and materials on the principal tasks and in the key areas, and to go all-out to reduce the depletion and waste of materials in order to produce much wealth and large quantities of goods with limited quantities of materials and facilities. In addition to plans to increase agricultural production we must pay attention to assuring the implementation of state plans with regard to mobilizing and turning in staple food, nonstaple food, industrial crops, and the other agricultural products.

The districts, provinces, and municipalities have the principal responsibility for organizing the drafting of base-level plans. The central sectors, especially the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Water Conservancy, the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Marine Products, the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Light Industry, the Ministry of Communications and Transportation, etc., must send cadres to work with the provinces in drafting sector plans at the district level. The Ministry of Defense must help the districts draft national defense plans in the sphere of the district and manifest them in the 1980 state plan. Such combined ministries as the Ministry of Finance, the State Bank, and the State Planning Commission must work with the provinces in helping the district synthesize all-round plans at the district level. The sectors at the central level must work through the provinces in helping the districts draft plans. The central-level sectors and the provinces must create conditions for the districts to draft their own plans and avoid drafting plans for them. The State Planning Commission is responsible for providing professional planning guidance and training at the district level, promulgating systems of norms and model plans for the district level which are streamlined and realistic and concentrate on the urgent problems.

2. Advancing to combining sector planning with local and regional planning.

a. In addition to doing a good job of drafting local (provincial and district) plans, the central-level sectors must firmly grasp their bases and work closely with the people's committees of the provinces and municipalities in drafting sector plans, in the spirit of fully utilizing the existing labor forces, machinery, equipment, materials and natural resources to promote production, increase labor productivity, and increase output for the state. The specialized ministries and specialized sectors must, on the basis of the enterprise combines, draft all-sector plans for the economic-technical sectors which have a relatively high degree of accumulation and concentration, such as textiles, tea, rubber, etc. With regard to those sectors, the Council of Ministers assigns all-sector plans to the enterprises, corporations, and general corporations, according to the recommendations made by the parent ministries and general departments. With regard to plans for clearing and developing the new economic zones, the Council of Ministers assigns all-round legal norms to the Ministry of Agriculture (the Land Clearance and New Economic Zone General Department), and at the same time informs the provincial and municipal people's committees in order to coordinate guidance of the implementation of the parts under the responsibility of the locality.

With regard to the other economic-technical sectors, the ministries and general departments must coordinate with the provincial and municipal people's committees in guiding the Services and Bureaus in drafting the sector plans at the local level, synthesizing those plans into an all-sector plan, and submitting the plan for approval by the Council of Ministers.

Before the provincial and municipal people's committees report their over-all plans to the Council of Ministers, it is essential that the Services and Bureaus report the local component of the sector plan to the parent ministry. Until it has obtained the opinions of the ministry or general department regarding the sector plan component, the Council of Ministers will not pass judgment on the over-all plans of the provinces and municipalities.

In order to assure unified management according to sectors on a nationwide basis after the local plans have been approved, the Council of Ministers will assign plans to the localities and at the same time assign them to the ministry or general department managing the sector and make it responsible for guiding the implementation of the plan. The norms assigned with the plan include those for products the localities produce on a contracted-out basis for the central sectors, including contracted-out goods for export and for the domestic commerce sector, and contracted-out artisan industry and handicraft goods.

b. On the basis of district plans drafted at the level of the cooperatives, enterprises, etc., the provinces and municipalities will take the initiative in synthesizing and balancing the plans of the provinces and municipalities. They will stress the norms regarding state purchasing and the delivery of products to the central level and for export, the transfer of labor to meet the needs of national defense and national economic development, budgetary

receipts, the good fulfillment of the combat readiness missions, strengthening the quality and economic effectiveness norms, and auditing in detail the contributions made by the localities to the central level and the part the central level provides for the provinces and municipalities.

3. Amending and supplementing the policies and regulations regarding economic management, strengthening political-ideological education, and launching a movement to compete in production labor and in economizing in order to surpass the 1979 state plan and do a good job of drafting the 1980 plan.

In addition to improving the system of legal norms in order to develop the initiative of the base level, the ministries (organs on a ministry level and organs directly under the Council of Ministers) must, within the sphere of their authority and in accordance with the division of labor carried out by the Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers, study and submit for promulgation by the Government economic policies to serve as a basis for determining plan norms and furthering the implementation of state plans, such as policies to stimulate the production and circulation of goods that are not managed by the state and the materials for which are not supplied by the state, especially those to stimulate the production of goods made from domestic raw materials, waste materials, or waste products; policies regarding the purchase prices of export goods and raw materials for making export goods; the policy regarding the use of foreign exchange by the bases, localities, and sectors producing export goods; policies regarding the economical use of raw materials, fuel, materials, etc.; and policies regarding salaries paid in money, salaries paid in kind, salary budget management etc.

The State Planning Commission, in coordination with the ministries and general departments, must study, and submit to the Council of Ministers for promulgation, systems regarding planning, especially with regard to investment in capital construction, division-of-labor indices for the balancing of materials, equipment, and goods; and planning by enterprise combines, in order to increase the effectiveness of plans and strengthen the legal code regarding planning.

We must closely combine the economic, administrative, and political-ideological measures in order to develop the collective mastership right of the working people at the base level, in the localities, and throughout the nation, in accordance with Decision No 182-CP of the Council of Minister, promulgated 26 April 1979, and launch a seething, continuous emulation movement to strengthen the initiative and creativity of the various categories of people, overcome difficulties, strive to increase labor productivity, and assure the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the 1979 plan and the drafting of a good 1980 plan.

5616
CSO: 4209

LABOR BALANCING AS PRECONDITION FOR PLAN BALANCING DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA [PLANNING REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 79 pp 25-31, 37

[Article by Trinh Trong Quy: "Making Labor Balancing the Starting Point in Plan Balancing at the Base Level"]

[Text] The resolution of the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee (fourth term) set forth the policy of "transforming planning along the lines of highly developing all existing and latent capabilities in our country, especially our labor forces, land, rich natural resources, material-technical bases, production tools, and materials, in order to overcome the difficulties and imbalances of the economy." There followed many party and state documents which concretized that policy by, among other things, stressing the balancing of labor as the starting point for balancing the various aspects of the plan.

By discussing the actual situation in a number of industrial and agricultural bases, we would like to present some initial thoughts on the subject of using the balancing of labor as the starting point for balancing plans at the basic unit level.

I. The Objective Necessity

The principal content of plan balancing is to balance needs and capabilities. Needs are usually expressed in terms of plan tasks, while capabilities are usually expressed in terms of the principal factors: materials, capital, and labor (also called manpower, material capability, and finance). To speak of the production capability of a base or sector is to speak of balancing all of its component factors. Therefore, plan balancing is balancing the tasks (needs) and the factors of materials, labor, and capital. In the past, when carrying out plan balancing the emphasis was usually on balancing materials and capital with the tasks; only then was the labor force appropriate to the capabilities of materials and capital calculated. For example, given the task of producing a certain quantity of production, the amount of machinery and equipment needed and the quantities of raw materials, fuel, materials, and capital the number of workers that would be used during the planning

period was calculated. Under the conditions of a shortage of machinery, equipment, raw materials, fuel, or materials, the number of workers was also reduced and the upper echelon will be requested to lower the plan norms.

That relatively passive way of balancing plans has limited the full utilization of our most precious source of capital--our plentiful labor supply--in developing the land, raw materials, and other latent capabilities of the nation in order to meet the increasingly greater needs of production and life. The new method of balancing plans is to make the labor supply the starting point, to regard labor as the main factor in balancing production capabilities in order to fulfill the plan tasks and thus to meet the needs. Labor is no longer a passive factor, but has become the central factor and plays the decisive role. Although attention is still paid to machinery, equipment, raw materials, materials, land, etc., they are no longer the central concern. Therefore, if there is a shortage of those factors we may develop the labor factor to the maximum in order to create substantial supplementation, and still advance to fulfilling the plan tasks with the greatest possible capabilities.

One question that is posed is whether manual labor can be used to supplement or replace all types of materials and equipment that are in short supply. We believe that some types can be directly created by manual labor in order to make up for the deficiency (for example, if there is a shortage of cultivated land and nitrogenous fertilizer it is possible to use manual labor to reclaim wasteland and produce organic fertilizer, if there is a shortage of trucks it is possible to mobilize nonmechanized transportation facilities, etc.). But manual labor cannot be used to directly overcome shortages of such materials and equipment as POL, iron and steel, modern machinery, etc. However, we can create those types of materials by manual labor but by means of exports (producing goods for export, producing goods on a contracted-out basis for foreign countries, etc.), to obtain foreign exchange with which to purchase materials and equipment. The important matter is that each production base be fully conscious of stressing the labor factor and of making labor the central factor when calculating its production capacity; if it is, it will apply many creative measures and forms to overcome shortages of specific materials when balancing its plan.

We understand making labor the starting point in balancing plans in that spirit.

The policy of making labor the starting point in balancing plans arises from the theoretical basis and actual situation of our country's economy.

First of all, labor is the greatest factor and plays a decisive role in the production process; it is the basic source of the creation of society's material wealth. To speak of labor is to speak of man and his unlimited creativity. For that reason, labor is regarded as the most valuable capital. Our regime makes concern for the all-round and increasingly higher development of the living standards of the workers and their families a struggle goal, and it also relies on the workers, with the development of their collective mastership right, to develop our economy and culture in order to attain that

noble goal. Using labor as the starting point for calculating capabilities in plan balancing is also manifesting collective mastership with regard to the labor force and using it with the highest effectiveness on a national scale, in each locality, and in each base. Furthermore, it manifests the motto of self-reliance and relying principally on ourselves in order to build an independent, autonomous economy for our country.

We are now encountering difficulties regarding imported materials which directly influence the production of many sectors. However, our labor forces, especially our manual labor forces, are very large. It is regrettable that our country's labor forces have not yet been fully utilized, for we still have much land, forest areas, and ocean areas which have not been fully exploited, and the capacities of many production bases, and much machinery and equipment, have been underutilized. If we know how to rationally distribute labor rationally and skillfully organize labor we will be able to fully utilize our rich labor resources in order to exploit our plentiful natural resources, create many products to serve the lives of the people, create domestic sources of materials to serve production, and create sources of exports to exchange for machinery, equipment, and other materials which we cannot yet produce.

In order to fulfill the important and urgent tasks set forth by our party, planning must "fully grasp the most important task: assuring that workers have employment, enough to eat, and enough to wear. If that is to be accomplished we must fully utilize our two strengths--labor and land--along with the other existing means of production, as outlined by the resolution the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee (fourth term). In other words, during the next few years we must by means of labor concentrate on definitively resolving the basic problems of society--food and clothing--and create a strong transformation to give impetus for strong, outstanding development in the future.

During the past several years, despite limited materials a considerable number of production bases, because they knew how to calculate capabilities on the basis of their large labor forces have been able to draft positive, solid plans and on that basis do a good job of guiding production.

In brief, actuality has demonstrated that using labor as the starting point in balancing plans in our country at present is something that is very necessary and can be extensively implemented in the sectors and echelons, first of all at the base level.

II. Plan Balancing Based on Labor Balancing in Each Type of Base

The task of balancing labor was discussed in a Council of Ministers report submitted prior to the meeting of the Fourth Session of the National Assembly (Sixth Term) on the 1979 plan tasks: "With regard to labor, the primary task of the sectors and localities is to be concerned with providing employment for everyone by rationally organizing and using on-the-spot labor and developing trades, while also continuing to promote the redistribution of labor on a national scale, in order to fully exploit the land, forests, sea, minerals, etc."

When making labor balancing the starting point in plan balancing, we have learned from studying the situations of a number of bases belonging to many different sectors that, depending on the specific situation and conditions of each base it is possible to carry out that task along the following lines:

Fully utilizing labor to create the objects of labor: organizing land clearing and restoration and area expansion; producing organic fertilizer to serve intensive cultivation; fully utilizing the earth and rock to produce construction materials; fully utilizing waste materials and waste products to produce materials to serve production; sending workers of agricultural products processing plants to produce agricultural raw materials (grow sugarcane, tea, tobacco, cotton, manioc, etc.) during the off-season; or utilizing labor to create material-technical bases to serve production and life; animal pens, workshops, drying patios, warehouses, capital construction in enterprises, etc.

Fully utilizing labor to develop secondary trades to produce consumer goods and export goods, or to produce goods on a contracted-out basis for foreign countries.

Rationally organizing labor to increase labor productivity, increase output, or transfer labor to other bases or spheres (especially the transfer of labor from cultivation to developing stock raising); or, as in the new situation, to transfer workers to meet the needs of combat readiness and combat. We must especially pay attention to considerably reducing the ratio of indirect labor in order to contribute to rapidly increasing labor productivity.

The capabilities and extent of utilizing labor along those lines differ between the agricultural bases and the industrial bases because in agriculture there are many kinds of materials which can be produced by manual labor. Moreover, our country's latent labor force--especially manual labor--exists principally in agriculture.

Those differences with regard to capability and degree of use are even more pronounced among bases which are in the same sector but differ with regard to degree of mechanization, for the bases the labor of which is primarily manual usually have more favorable conditions for developing the labor factor than those fully equipped with machinery and equipment. Therefore, when dealing with the matter of balancing plans in accordance with the new viewpoints in the bases of each sector, the bases may be categorized according to their level of mechanization, i.e. place the bases with the same level of mechanization in the same category. Under our country's present circumstances, the mechanization level of agriculture is much lower than that of industry, and in each sector the collective bases usually have a lower level of mechanization than the state bases. Therefore, such a categorization according to level of mechanization will, in many instances, also serve to distinguish between the levels of socialization of the means of production or between the economic components.

The following are some experiences regarding plan balancing by making labor balancing the starting point with regard to each type of base:

1. With regard to agricultural production bases.

In our country at present, nearly all of the cooperatives are at a very low level of mechanization. Generally speaking, they have only been able to mechanize 30 to 45 percent of the soil-preparation work, 30 to 40 percent of transportation, 50 to 60 percent of the water pumping, 50 to 60 percent of the rice threshing, etc. Therefore, most of the field work is still done by manual labor. Thus plan balancing in accordance with the new viewpoint of making labor balancing the starting point for calculating production capability has an especially important significance with regard to the agricultural production bases.

With regard to the agricultural production bases which have a low level of mechanization, when balancing plans it is necessary to fully utilize labor in intensive cultivation, increasing the number of growing seasons, expanding acreage, promoting stock raising, developing material-technical bases, developing sectors and trades, etc. If that is to be accomplished, we must first of all have full knowledge of the labor force--the structure of age groups, sex, health, occupations, and educational levels--and then balance it with the requirements for transferring labor from the bases (to enter the armed forces, to become industrial workers, to go to develop new economic zones, etc. The number of workers to remain behind must be calculated in accordance with progressive norms in order to achieve balance with the production tasks at the base level. There must be specific plans for the full utilization of the redundant letter.

Many cooperatives cultivating long-developed land have experience in fully utilizing labor in intensive cultivation and in increasing the number of growing seasons, and in mobilizing labor to produce the various types of animal manure, green fertilizer, azolla, and alluvium in order to increase the amount of fertilizer spread on crops; in improving soil quality (by spreading lime and phosphate, purging acidity, and washing out salinity); in improving the surface area; and in raising the level of low-lying fields in order to transform one-season fields into two-season fields, or to introduce winter crops into two-season rice fields or fields growing one rice crop and one subsidiary food crop. Therefore, by means of stepping up fertilizer production, irrigation, soil improvement, and surface improvement by the labor of the bases, combined with research to find an appropriate crop structure for each field, etc., we can increase crop yields and rapidly increase the turnaround time of the land, forcing it to provide many products the year around.

In addition to promoting intensive cultivation and increasing the number of growing seasons, it is possible to fully utilize labor in expanding the cultivated area by, for example, clearing and reclaiming wasteland and improving land with agricultural potential. Experience demonstrates that capabilities for expanding the cultivated area exist not only in areas with much wasteland, such as the piedmont and mountain regions; it is possible to increase the

cultivated area even in the delta area. In 1978 alone the My Tho cooperative added 17 hectares by land filling; the An My cooperative added 90 hectares of cultivated land by restoring fallow fields, filling in depressions, and transplanting rice seedlings, etc.

In order to advance stock raising to the status of a principal production sector which is in balance with cultivation, an important factor is increasing the number of workers in that sector. If that is to be accomplished we must rationally deploy labor and increase labor productivity in the cultivation sector, in order to gradually shift the redundant workers to the stock raising sector. We especially must concentrate labor in intensively cultivating, and increasing the number of growing seasons on, the land set aside for collective stock raising, in order to rapidly create a plentiful source of feed and create a solid basis on which to strongly develop collective hog raising.

An important direction for achieving an on-the-spot division of labor is to expand the secondary trades in the cooperatives. Along those lines, it is possible to fully utilize idle labor during the off-season, workers who are old and weak, and children not yet of working age; it is possible to fully utilize not only workers who already have skills (blacksmiths, carpenters, masons, etc.), but also workers who are now at their trades; and it is possible to organize workers concentrated in the cooperatives' handicraft shops, and can also fully utilize free time in the families, etc.

All bases have very great and urgent requirements for construction materials (to build material-technical bases for the cooperatives, housing for the people, cultural and welfare installations, etc.), and everywhere there are obtainable raw materials and labor for production. They may fully utilize hillocks, and high-lying land to produce bricks and tiles (in combination with filling in and improving the fields). Those with rock deposits may quarry rock in order to open lime kilns and obtain rock for construction and road surfacing. Those with kaolinite soil may mine that adhesive substance and supply it to cement plants. In places with favorable conditions, it is necessary to expand the production of construction materials to meet the needs of both the localities and the nation.

In addition to producing construction materials, each cooperative must select cooperative members skilled in carpentry, masonry, blacksmithing, machinery repair, etc., organize them into basic construction units, agricultural machinery units, etc., to serve as the hard core in building the cooperatives' material-technical bases and repairing and producing hand tools and improved tools.

We also have agricultural production cooperatives which have good capabilities for organizing secondary handicraft and artistic trades, to produce consumer goods for domestic consumption and export. There are many trades and products: embroidery, lace, lacquerware, carvings, wool weaving, the weaving of cloth for blankets, towels, and socks, woven rattan and bamboo products, window shades and mats, rugs, earthenware, etc. Each cooperative can develop its traditional trades (such as Song Dong rattan products, An Do chopsticks,

Chuong straw hats, Binh Da firecrackers, etc.), or may send people to other localities to study the trades there and ply those trades in the cooperative. They may stress trades which can make use of local raw materials or of materials for which there are stable sources of supply.

The material conditions for assuring the strong, solid development of the cultivation, stock raising, and handicraft sectors mentioned above are the cooperatives' material-technical bases. But, generally speaking, in the cooperatives those sectors are weak, deficient, and incomplete. State investment in the bases is limited and has not kept up with the requirements of production and life. Therefore, the construction of material-technical bases by each cooperative is an urgent requirement. Many cooperatives have experience in fully utilizing manual labor forces to do irrigation work, complete the rural road network, build warehouses, drying patios, seed germination buildings, compost buildings, handicraft workshops, stock pens, etc. The cooperatives' large labor force, combined with state aid with regard to materials and machinery, will create a combined strength with which to gradually build and complete the material-technical bases of each cooperative. That is the most active, positive measure in building material-technical bases in order to meet the needs of production and life in each base.

2. With regard to the artisan industry and handicrafts cooperatives.

Although the artisan industry and handicrafts production bases have some machinery and equipment, because of the nature of their production most of their work is still done by hand. When balancing plans in such bases there are many ways and many flexible forms for fully utilizing labor.

First of all, it is possible to rationally organize labor, combined with improving techniques and rationalizing the production line, in order to bring about high labor productivity. On that basis we can reduce the number of workers required and assign those who are redundant to producing raw materials and fully utilizing waste materials and waste products to serve the production of principal or secondary products, and such labor can be used to develop new trades and products. After improving techniques and mechanizing the lime production line, in 1978 the Quyet Tien lime cooperative in Ha Bac not only doubled its output in comparison to previous years but was able to shift hundreds of workers over to the development of other trades, especially the production of bricks. The cooperative's greatest difficulty was that it suffered a chronic shortage of limestone and coal, and the limestone and coal supplied annually by the state met only half the production need. The cooperative used its labor to collect hundreds of tons of partly burned coal and thousands of tons of poor-quality coal, and to quarry thousands of tons of limestone for use in production, thus assuring sufficient materials to surpass the state plan.

Many artisan industry and handicrafts cooperatives in Ha Dong City have used the waste materials and waste products of the Thai Nguyen iron and steel complex and of the factories in the province to produce many consumer goods, such as cooking tripods, hinges, compasses, steel clamps, toys, etc.

The cooperatives may also fully utilize their labor along the lines of accepting contracts to produce semi-finished products and components for the industrial enterprises. The Truong Bac metals cooperative in Hanoi, after calculating its production capabilities on the basis of labor balancing, accepted contracted to produce brake cables for the bicycle enterprise combine and the Hanoi Motorcycle-Motorbicycle Corporation, and to produce plastic sandals for the Hanoi Industrial Products Corporation.

Calculating production capabilities on the basis of labor can also serve to develop the workers' creativity, in order to improve implements, make equipment, and increase the production capability of the bases. Many cooperatives in the city of Ha Dong have drafted plans for the production of equipment by highly skilled cooperative members. The Hop Luc cooperative manufactures its own nail-making machinery, the Hop Nhat cooperative makes its own firecracker-packing machines, and the Doan Ket cooperative in Hanoi makes full use of waste materials to make its own sheetmetal-cutting machines, tube-cutting machines, milling machines, metal-rolling machines, handlebar-shaping machines, etc., which has enabled the production capability of the bases to increase rapidly.

3. With regard to the state industrial bases.

The state industrial bases usually have production lines which are stable and are more highly mechanized than those of the agricultural cooperatives and artisan industry-handicrafts cooperatives. In such bases the full utilization of labor in plan balancing should be along the lines of increasing the number of work-shifts in order to fully utilize equipment capacity, expanding the extra-plan products made from waste materials and waste products to create supplementary sources of raw materials, repairing machinery and equipment, doing capital construction, etc.

By reorganizing labor and rationalizing the production line it is possible to economize on labor and transfer the redundant labor to the production of extra-plan products made from waste materials and rejects, or organize the collecting and preliminary processing of waste materials and waste products to create sources of raw materials to supplement the production of principal products, in order to contribute to assuring uninterrupted production, increase the value of the enterprises' output, and increase production for society. The Kien Thiet Machinery Enterprise in Haiphong was able to determine which products were most stable by studying the production and marketing of products over a period of many years and making studies to grasp the current needs of the market. For each of those products the enterprise set up a separate production line, from the mold-making phase to the product finishing phase. The enterprise readjusted its labor norms to make them more rational, then recalculated the number of workers, and their skill levels, necessary for each work place and each production line. Therefore, in 1977 the enterprise used 40 redundant workers to use 20 tons of waste materials to produce such new products as washer rings, gaskets, children's bicycles, and a number of other toys, and increased the value of production by 300,000 dong. At the same time, it organized transportation teams to serve customers and provided mid-shift meals for the workers.

And by reorganizing labor it is possible to find the most rational way to utilize the labor, equipment, and production areas of the enterprises, in order to increase labor productivity and output. The coal mining enterprises in Quang Ninh improved their labor organization by evaluating and rearranging the existing labor forces of the production teams and units and the work shifts, achieving a rational division of labor between principal workers and secondary and service workers in order to increase the working time in the pits, fully utilize the capacities of the pits, and increase labor productivity and the output of coal. At the Mao Khe mine, in October 1977 the coal output (working four shifts) over September 1977 (working three shifts) by 90 percent (from 22,556 tons to 42,825 tons), while the number of workers increased only 26 percent. Therefore, labor productivity increased by 52 percent. At the Ha Lam coal mine, when Construction-Installation Enterprise No 5 organized its work in four shifts its output also increased 33 percent but its work force increased by only 14 to 15 percent.

With regard to the enterprises the production of which is clearly of a seasonal nature, it is possible to add manual workers during the busiest times (on a temporary contract basis) in order to increase the number of shifts, fully utilize the machinery and equipment, and create conditions for increasing output. For example, the Hanoi Alcohol Distillery normally worked two shifts, but during the peak seasons (during the fruit harvesting season or the pre-Tet months) it hired 150-200 additional temporary manual workers to supplement the production line where simple labor is required (bottle washing, transportation, etc.) and add a shift. Therefore, its output increased by 25-30 percent.

With regard to the bases which produce by assembling many components, or which can detach the semi-finishing process from the enterprise's production line, can use manual labor to increase output by contracting out work to artisan industry-handicraft cooperatives, agricultural cooperatives, or even families, and regard them as satellites of the enterprise. The Level-1 Motorcycle-Bicycle Corporation in Ho Chi Minh City contracted out the various kinds of bicycle parts to more than 100 artisan industry-handicraft bases in the city, and after a short period of time the corporation was able to get more than 600 tons of parts, including the various kinds of bicycle and motorbicycle hubs, handlebars, rims, etc. The corporation also contracted out the production of bicycle and motorbicycle parts to bases in many other provinces, thereby using labor and materials to create a rich source of parts, and providing work for thousands of workers. Similarly, the Singer Sewing Machine Enterprise organized a system of satellites consisting of nearly 100 bases (including family bases) with unified management, in order to fully utilize workers and develop their technical capabilities to produce many components and serve the fulfillment of the enterprise's plan.

Furthermore, the full utilization in plan balancing can also be oriented toward such tasks as repairing machinery and equipment to reduce machinery down-time, increase production capabilities, and increase output; and utilizing redundant labor to build or repair workshops and housing or do a number of jobs to serve the people's lives and improve the working and living conditions of the cadres and workers.

III. Relevant Problems Which Must Be Resolved

In order to carry out base-level plan balancing along the lines of making labor balancing the starting point, we must resolve a whole series of problems, from ideological awareness and manifesting a spirit of socialist collective mastership with regard to labor to completely changing the planning procedures and amending and supplementing the economic management policies and regulations, etc., with the goal of assuring the bases' right of economic and financial autonomy.

With regard to planning, on the basis of long-range plans which clearly state their production directions and missions, each base must draft five-year plans in which it must set forth the direction and measures for fully utilizing labor to meet the norms. Annual plans must be drafted to gradually concretize the five-year plans, and it is necessary to adhere closely to the specific directions and tasks in rationally arranging the production line, technical processes, machinery and equipment, production area, and the cultivation tasks, and in uncovering the weak links and aspects in order to resolve them. They must draft many plans to cope with many different situations regarding materials and capital, and methods of using labor, and from them select the best plan for utilizing labor, exploiting the base's production capability, and producing most products for society.

Based on the over-all plans and the generalized norms, the production bases have the right to determine specific norms and products to assure implementation of the state plan, while at the same time fully utilizing their remaining capacity to produce additional principal and secondary and secondary products, based on direct relations with the customers.

With regard to the industrial bases capable of fully utilizing their own waste materials and waste products or those of other bases to produce consumer goods or to supplement the materials for making the principal products (such as the Hanoi Lock Enterprise's use of scrap copper to make high-quality copper for use in locks), we should assign suitable labor norms so that the bases will be capable of organizing the exploitation of waste materials for processing into materials usable in production. Surplus workers should be detached from the principal production line and paid from a separate salary fund to avoid influencing the labor force and productivity of the principal production line. The upper echelon should only assign to the enterprises the total salary and labor productivity norms of the principal production element.

In addition to planning, there must be systems and policies regarding materials, prices, worker welfare, etc., to encourage the full utilization of labor in developing production at the base level.

With regard to materials, there must be suitable policies to encourage the development of local sources of raw materials and the full utilization of materials that do not meet specifications or are of low quality, and of waste materials and products. At present there exists the situation of many bases

still having many types of materials left over in the warehouse because they do not meet specifications or are lacking in quality, but meet the specifications and quality standards of other bases. Those materials should be readjusted, and that readjustment may be carried out by the materials supply organ or the Ministry of Supply. But it is also possible to open stores or depots to display stagnated materials in a province or on a national basis (with the names of the organs with surplus materials and the quantities of those materials listed) so that the organs which need them can get in touch and present their requirements. The relevant materials supply organ will serve as the intermediary in exchanging materials under the centralized management of the state, while the bases may directly exchange or buy and sell the other kinds of materials. With regard to the poor-quality materials, waste materials, and waste products, the bases should be allowed to exchange them directly to achieve maximum benefit for production.

The state should set aside a number of materials necessary for the production of the bases' secondary materials, such as coal for the production of bricks and tiles, cement for capital construction in the cooperatives, tin, acid for the production of consumer goods from scrap metal, etc. The amounts of such materials are not great but they are very necessary for the bases' production, and if the state provides them it will strongly stimulate the full utilization of on-the-spot labor and materials, and waste materials and products will be transformed into wealth for society. At the same time, according to the type of product the state will, by means of two-way contracts, purchase part or all of the bases' output.

With regard to prices, there must be suitable purchase prices for the various types of waste materials and waste products that can be utilized, in order to encourage their recovery, especially with regard to the types which can be processed into principal production materials (such as scrap copper and aluminum for the Hanoi Lock Enterprise, rejected rubber products for the bases producing rubber products, etc.).

With regard to the products included in the main product line of the base the production costs of which increase because waste materials and products must be used, the state should readjust the prices in order to be appropriate to the actual production situation and stimulate the use of waste materials in place of standard materials, especially those which must be imported (for example, among the various types of locks produced in 1978 by the Hanoi Lock Enterprise were those made from scrap brass).

With regard to the secondary, extra-plan products made from the waste materials and products of the enterprise or of other bases, permission should be given to sell them at suitable prices according to economic contracts between the producing party and the consuming party.

With regard to workers, it is necessary to strengthen them politically and ideologically, and be concerned with their material and cultural lives.

We must strengthen education and create conditions for truly exercising the collective mastership right of the workers, which will serve to strongly

stimulate progress in production and management. That collective mastership right must be exercised first of all at the base level. Therefore, we must pay all-out attention to democratizing planning at the base level. In the process of discussing and drafting base-level plans, it is necessary to focus the collective ability and intelligence of the workers and cooperative members on seeking specific, creative ways to overcome difficulties in production, such as economizing on raw materials and materials, fully utilizing waste materials and products, producing spare parts and repairing machinery, seeking replacement materials, improving the technical processes, rationalizing the production line, etc., in order to increase the production capability of the enterprise. On that basis, they must participate in determining the plan norms and increasing the positiveness and solidity of the plan. Then, during the phase of implementing the plan, the exercising of the collective mastership right of the workers and cooperative members is an extremely important factor in creating a seething mass emulation movement to victoriously fulfill the state plan.

In addition to political-ideological education there are many other policies and systems which must receive attention, such as the salary and bonus system and strengthening the system of material responsibility, in order to encourage workers to go all-out and contribute positively to fulfilling the state plan. In each base, the government and trade union are responsible for improving the working conditions, diet, and housing of the workers, while also doing a good job of organizing study, raising the educational level, improving vocational skills, and meeting the other cultural needs, in order to create favorable conditions for the all-round development of workers.

5616
CSO: 4209

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

DETAILS OF 1979 STATE PLAN ADJUSTMENTS REVEALED

Hanoi TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA [PLANNING REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 79 pp 1-5

[Article: "Firmly Grasp the Main Concerns of the 1979 and 1980 State Plans"]

[Text] Editor's Note: The 1979 state plan was approved by the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee and by the National Assembly at the beginning of the year. The Political Bureau and the Council of Ministers have reviewed and supplemented to make it appropriate to the new situation, in order to guide the implementation of the 1979 plan and draft the 1980 plan. This article deals with those developments.

Although defeated in our country during the recent war of aggression, the Chinese reactionaries have not abandoned their basic, long-range plot of annexing our country and forcing our people to submit to them. They are continually creating a tense situation, seeking all ways to weaken us, and creating conditions for carrying out their expansionist plot.

In order to defeat all their plots and acts, a basic requirement is that we must rapidly increase our strength in all regards. We must be strong with regard to both economics and national defense: we must be strong economically in order to have strong national defense, and strong defensively in order to protect our economic development.

The Council of Ministers report delivered to the Fifth Session of the National Assembly, sixth term, by Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap, a member of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, a Vice Premier, and Minister of National Defense, stated that "Our country is now at peace, but war could break out at any time. In order to take the initiative under all circumstances, the only correct path along which to lead our country to victory is to take it rich economically and strong defensively, strongly defending the socialist homeland while doing an increasingly better job of assuring the living standards of our people and servicemen." (From NHAN DAN, 31 May 1979.)

Therefore, we must firmly grasp the two strategic missions:

Promoting production, carrying out socialist transformation, and building socialism, and being prepared to fight and fighting resolutely to defend the homeland.

In conformity with the spirit of the fourth and fifth plenums of the Party Central Committee, the Resolution of the Political Bureau, and the 1979 and 1980 state plans, we must fully mobilize the strength of the entire population and the entire armed services to fulfill the following common missions:

Promoting production, carrying out socialist transformation, and stabilizing and assuring the people's living standards.

Strengthening national defense and security, defending the homeland, meeting the requirements of combat and combat readiness, and closely combining the economy with national defense.

Continuing to build material-technical bases in order to meet the immediate requirements, while preparing conditions for future development.

In addition to the common missions listed above, we must do a good job of fulfilling our international obligation toward our friends Laos and Kampuchea.

The principal direction for stabilizing and assuring the people's living conditions during the coming period is to concentrate first of all on resolving the food problem, then the problem of clothing, while going all-out to assure the essential consumer goods made of domestic raw materials and to do a better job of improving the living conditions of people in the areas that have recently been devastated and in the cities and industrial zones. Along those lines, planning must concentrate on the principal objectives set forth in the Resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee: staple food, nonstaple food, consumer goods, and exports. We must rely on the exploitation of the latent capabilities, closely combine socialist transformation with the reorganization and development of production, be concerned with both production and state purchasing, and control the sources of goods.

In the new situation, we must do a good job of meeting the needs of national defense and security. We must fulfill the missions of recruiting troops and assigning labor to the armed forces, and in doing so must both select the right people and assure the necessary number of management cadres and technical cadres and workers for the economic sectors. We must resolutely set aside forces to strengthen the state's reserves and assure the ability to cope with all situations. Each base, locality, and economic sector must draft plans to shift the economy to a war footing.

"We must closely combine the economy with national defense when developing the structure of the national economy, in each economic-technical sector, in each base and locality, in each territorial area, and on a national scale. That is a matter of arranging the strategic structure and creating a strategic posture with regard to economics and national defense. It is also a matter of zoning and planning; rationally combining labor with the land and with natural resources; and of rationally positioning the economic areas and the populated areas in both the short term and the long term, thus enabling our country to have an increasingly strong strategic economic and national defense

system, especially in the strategic areas which may become the front line and in important areas which may be regarded as solid rear areas. (Report of the Council of Ministers at the Fifth Session of the National Assembly, Sixth Term.) In order to have sufficient military forces to cope with all circumstances, while also developing the economy and improving the people's living conditions, the basic direction is to, on the one hand, rapidly increase labor productivity on the basis of the good utilization of the existing labor, land, and material-technical bases, for they are the sources of the creation of material wealth with which to meet the needs of national defense, improve living conditions, and increase accumulation for the economy. On the other hand, the armed forces must fully utilize their economic capabilities, positively produce goods, and gradually meet the ever-increasing quartermaster requirements.

The direction for constructing material-technical bases in the new situation is to concentrate capital and material facilities on the urgent projects that serve national defense, the projects that serve and promote food production and serve exports, the projects that assure communications, the transition projects that can be brought into production in 1979-1980, the projects for developing domestic raw materials, and the industrial projects of decisive importance with regard to economic development. Construction will begin only on projects which are deemed truly necessary and which will have sufficient raw materials when they begin production. With regard to the labor-intensive projects which require few materials (such as a number of irrigation, afforestation, and land clearing projects carried out by manual labor), it is necessary to accelerate their construction along the lines of the good mobilization of obligatory labor and reducing budget expenditures. In general, because material conditions are limited and because it is necessary to set aside some materiel for national defense, in building material-technical bases it is necessary to concentrate on the priority objectives, complete their construction, and go all-out to avoid intermittent, prolonged, inefficient construction. While urgently fulfilling the immediate missions, it is also necessary to urgently prepare in all respects--with regard to planning, basic studies, designing, cadre and worker training, etc.--for future large-scale construction.

In order to fulfill those three common missions, the 1979 state plan, and the control figures of the 1980 state plan, have the following principal objectives:

1. Endeavoring to promote agricultural production, especially food production, and developing forestry and fishing.

2. Promoting the production of export goods and positively preparing conditions for creating outstanding new development with regard to exports in future years. Strengthening economic relations with foreign countries, and especially expanding economic cooperation with Laos, Kampuchea, and the COMECON nations.

3. Fully developing the production of consumer goods, especially those made from domestic raw materials.

4. Greatly strengthening the communications and transportation sector, so that it is sufficiently strong to meet the needs of production and construction in the new situation.

5. Fully developing the heavy industry sectors in order to do a better job of serving agriculture, communications and transportation, and the other important economic sectors, and meet the requirements of developing the economy and strengthening national defense.

6. Rectifying capital construction and drafting capital construction investment plans in the new situation that are appropriate to capital and construction materials capabilities, and studying the redistribution of labor along the lines of the new strategic deployment.

7. Rectifying and strengthening circulation and distribution, promoting above all state purchasing in order to control the sources of goods and giving all-out attention to improving the people's living conditions, paying special attention to the northern border area, the large cities, and the industrial zones.

8. Meeting, as well as possible, the requirements regarding the strengthening of national defense, and promoting the tasks of protecting political security and maintaining social order.

9. Rapidly restoring production in the areas affected by the fighting, cleaning up the environment, aiding refugees, stabilizing living conditions, and urgently restoring bridges, roads, and communications.

10. Stressing, and improving the quality of, research, the application of science and technology, and cultural and educational work; positively preparing for the transformation of education; and determine a rational structure and scale for cadre and worker training, the care of mothers and children, and the physical education and sports activities.

11. Promoting socialist transformation in the south, continuing to perfect socialist production relationships in the north, and resolutely creating a new transformation with regard to management and implementation guidance. Developing the collective mastership right of the working people and launching a socialist emulation movement with a revolutionary spirit on the part of the entire population and the entire army, in order to victoriously fulfill the mission of building and defending the homeland.

In fulfilling those principal missions it is necessary to concentrate on, and seek all ways to resolve, the key problem of creating conditions for the fulfillment of the other missions, and bring about a general transformation in the economic situation. With regard to the 1979 and 1980 state plans, the key economic problems are:

The food problem (including production, state purchasing, processing, and distribution), especially in the key areas.

Export goods, especially the main products the production of which we are capable of accelerating.

Consumer goods, especially the essential consumer goods made from domestic raw materials.

Transportation, especially the handling of imports.

With regard to agriculture, a number of points have been added to the agricultural production plan.

First, the new situation greatly increases the need for staple food and nonstaple food, in order to meet the requirements of consumption, combat readiness, and stockpiling, meet the raw material needs of industry, and increase the supply of goods for export.

Second, since the southwestern border region is at peace we have conditions for fully utilizing land that has long been fallow, and for continuing to build the material-technical bases in agriculture.

Third, the material conditions for serving agriculture are in some respects limited.

Therefore, the missions that are posed for the sectors and localities is to develop the advantages, overcome the difficulties, and go all-out to attain the plan norms set at the beginning of the year. In order to assure the fulfillment of those norms, it is necessary to truly concentrate on all aspects of agricultural production: concentrating investment capital, facilities, and cadres; concentrating on organizing and guiding implementation; and concentrating on the key areas. While guiding the implementation of the 1979 staple food production plan it is necessary to draft a complete program with the objective of resolving the staple food problems within 3 years, and to take guidance measures to assure solid implementation, especially in the key areas producing many commodity agricultural products. With regard to the nation as a whole, we must concentrate on the key rice-growing areas (the Bac Bo delta and the Mekong delta, especially the provinces of Minh Hai, Hau Giang, and Kien Giang) and the key subsidiary food crop areas (the Tay Nguyen region and eastern Nam Bo). Each province and district must determine the key areas on which they must concentrate their guidance. They must endeavor to promote production to meet the local food needs, and contribute increasingly large amounts to the state.

Attention must be paid to promoting the growing of industrial crops included in the plan, especially the growing of such short-term industrial crops as jute, rush, tobacco, soybeans, castor beans, etc., in the concentrated areas, and special attention must be paid to strongly developing mulberry, jute, cotton, etc., to rapidly resolve the clothing problem. We must urgently provide additional labor and assure transportation facilities in order to fully utilize cultivated land, intensively cultivate the long-term industrial crops (rubber, coffee, and tea), and prepare conditions for greatly increasing

new cultivated land in the future. We must do a good job of supplying vegetables to the cities and industrial zones.

With regard to animal husbandry, we must correct an incorrect way of thinking that is of long standing: that staple food must receive first priority, then animal husbandry (i.e., because there is a shortage of staple food collective hog raising cannot be developed), which creates a deadlock that cannot be broken. It must be clearly stated that only by strongly developing animal husbandry can there be a basis for intensive cultivation and for resolving the staple food problem. Under the present conditions, it is necessary to the good implementation of policies to encourage collectives and peasant households to increase the raising of water buffaloes, cattle, hogs, ducks, chickens, etc., in order to have nonstaple food for domestic consumption and export, and to have a plentiful supply of fertilizer for agricultural production. In the immediate future, it is necessary to do a good job of raising hogs for export by the contracting-out method. In 1979 we must organize the raising of hogs for export in the areas around Ho Chi Minh City in order to fully utilize the existing material-technical bases (well-equipped animal feed processing bases, animal husbandry bases, and slaughter houses).

In 1979 and 1980 we must concentrate on doing a good job of constructing the irrigation projects that can be mobilized to serve the production of staple food and the areas growing industrial crops on a large scale. Attention must be paid to completing the irrigation systems, from the main installations to the drainage ditches, etc. Irrigation expenditures must be closely managed and the effectiveness of investment in irrigation must be closely managed.

In view of the limited supply of chemical fertilizer, we must concentrate our guidance on the mass movement to fully utilize the sources of manure, green fertilizer, and azolla, improve the fields, obtain alluvium for the 10th month crop, etc. In 1979 it is necessary to bring about a clear transformation in the movement to produce fertilizer and use organic fertilizer in the southern provinces, especially in the cooperatives and production collectives. We must promote the production of lime, stone, and crushed lime, and mine small phosphate and apatite mines. Supplies of chemical fertilizer are limited, so it must be distributed rationally, and it must be concentrated in the key areas producing many agricultural products, and not spread it all over on an equalizing basis. We must rationally utilize insecticides and combine the selection of seedstock with the prevention and elimination of insects and diseases in order to attain high yields and reduce damage caused by insects and disease.

In addition to promoting land clearing and adding new cultivable land, we must pay much attention to assuring the quality of our land clearing operations, continue to consolidate the land we have cleared during the past several years, and complete the development of the new economic zones in order to truly transform those areas into well-developed areas with stable populations. We must pay attention to sending workers to the key areas, the

northern border provinces, the Tay Nguyen region, the Mekong Delta, and eastern Nam Bo. We must launch a mass movement to clear land in the districts and provinces, and develop all the land that can be used for agriculture in the lowland and piedmont regions. We must step up the restoration of all wasteland in the southwestern and northern border provinces. With regard to the new economic zones, we must both build up the cooperatives and pay attention to building up the state farms which specialize in growing staple food crops and the industrial crops, thus assuring that the state will continue to control an important part of the commodity agricultural output.

Since the supplies of POL, spare parts, and components are limited, the existing machinery must be well utilized and maintained in order to mechanize agriculture.

Careful calculations must be made when distributing new tractors: they must be concentrated in the areas which are in urgent need of them and which are capable of managing and utilizing them well in order to attain clear economic effectiveness.

We must concentrate our guidance on doing a good job of transforming agriculture in the south in order to essentially complete the cooperativization of agriculture, create a new motive force for stimulating production, and assure state purchasing and the improvement of the peasants' living conditions. We must continue to expand and closely guide the study movement, catch up with and surpass the advanced cooperatives in all parts of the country, and as part of the effort to step up the development of the district echelon give a strong impetus to the simultaneous implementation of the three revolutions in the rural areas.

With regard to forestry, we must step up afforestation and pay special attention to the areas producing raw materials for making paper and growing wood for mining timber, and the Lam Dong pine tree area. Good preparations must be made to accelerate afforestation in the future.

The existing capabilities must be well utilized to attain and surpass the planned logging output norms, including the norm for shoring timber for the coal sector, for that is one of the important elements in the implementation of the coal mining plan. We must also assure sufficient wood for building ships and boats, for plywood and veneer, and for export. We must concentrate our guidance on the key logging areas in the Tay Nguyen region, eastern Nam Bo, and the former Zone 4. We must urgently construct veneer enterprises and provide additional equipment to the localities so that they can process wood for export. It is necessary to closely guide, and create all necessary conditions for, the production of pine resin to serve paper production and rapidly increase pine resin output in future years.

With regard to fishing, we must endeavor to catch a large amount of ocean fish and surpass the marine products export norms. Attention must be paid to state purchasing, to turning over marine products to the state, and especially to transporting fish to the North to serve the lives of the people.

We must stimulate the strong development of the trades requiring little machinery or POL, concentrate the existing ships and boats in the areas with many shrimp and fish, and organize and manage rear services and state purchasing by the marine products sector to reduce the time spent at sea.

A very important task of the marine products sector in 1979 and 1980 is to concentrate its guidance and facilities on catching shrimp and squid for export, especially in the provinces of Minh Hai and Thuan Hai. We must strongly develop the raising of shrimp in places where there are conditions for doing so, and create all necessary conditions for rapidly increasing the amount of shrimp and squid during future years.

With regard to industry, the direction for drafting industrial plans in 1979 and 1980 will be to:

Develop the production of goods made from domestic raw materials (such as the processing of manioc, subsidiary food crops and animal feed, the production of earthenware and porcelain, glass, wood products, school equipment, items used in day-care centers, toys, etc.). In order to create a strong transformation in the exploitation of domestic raw materials, collect and fully utilize waste materials and waste products, and mobilize stagnant materials in production, we resolve problems regarding guidance, management, and policies in order to purchase agricultural raw materials, especially in the concentrated production areas, and assure the good utilization of the capacities of processing plants. The state will promulgate policies to expand the right of state enterprises and collective and individual production bases in the production and marketing of products the production materials of which were not supplied by the state. We must truly encourage, and create conditions for, artisan industry and handicrafts, including individual producers, to increase the quantity and variety of consumer goods.

Positively assuring the necessary conditions for the development of export goods, and promoting the production of items which are urgently needed for national defense.

With regard to products made from imported raw materials, it is necessary to arrange production so that it is appropriate to the actual raw materials supply. Along those lines, the consumer goods industry must be concerned with stepping up the processing of subsidiary food crops, developing the consumer goods made from domestic raw materials and the export goods, and especially with expanding production contracted with foreign countries.

With regard to the heavy industry sectors, we must increase the amount of electricity to serve production but reduce the amount used by the people. Positive steps must be taken to assure sufficient labor and mine-support timber, and import spare parts, vehicles, and machinery in order to attain the planned coal output and step up coal mining in the various localities. The machinery sector must concentrate on meeting the needs of national defense and communications and transportation, and on producing ordinary implements, improved implements, and machinery to serve agriculture.

It must go all-out to step up the production of spare parts and the repair of machinery and equipment. The chemical sector must concentrate its guidance on rapidly restoring the Cam Duong apatite mine, mine apatite at all mines where it is possible to do so, and positively develop the rock-crushing installations in the provinces with limestone. The construction materials sector must promote the production of cement, brick, and tiles, increase the quarrying of the various kinds of rock, and develop the various kinds of non-baked materials in order to build housing and the projects requiring little reinforced concrete.

On the basis of agricultural, forestry, fishing, and industrial production we must do a good job of exporting, circulating and distributing, financial accounting, labor and salaries, etc.

We have above presented matters which must be fully grasped in the contents of the 1980 state plan so that the sectors and localities, especially the bases and districts, can apply them when drafting their plans. The drafting of the 1980 plan has a very great significance with regard to the truly good implementation of the 1979 plan. We must bring about an even stronger transformation in planning, transform planning with regard to both contents and methods, do a truly good job of drafting the 1980 plan, and assure that the plan is positive, solid, and worthy of being the principal tool our party and state use to manage the over-all national economy and do a truly good job of meeting the great and urgent requirements of the enterprise of developing and defending the homeland.

5616
CSO: 4209

ROLE OF STATE BANK IN EXPORTING DISCUSSED

Hanoi NGOAI THUONG [FOREIGN TRADE] in Vietnamese No 1, Jan 79 pp 10-14 & 19

[Article by Nguyen Duy Lo: "Develop the Role of the State Bank System in Fulfilling the Export Mission"]

[Text] To date, the total amount of aid capital and credit provided to us by the socialist countries, other friendly countries, and international organizations has met only part of the requirements of the Second Five-Year Plan.

In order to meet the export needs of the five-year plan (1976-1980), in order to develop production and balancing many aspects of social life, the problem of exports is a very great one of strategic significance and is a very urgent requirement.

Exporting is a combined economic activity which encompasses everything from production to marketing, both at home and abroad, and must always be closely bound to the other economic activities and especially to the State Bank system. In order to strongly develop the role of the State Bank system in fulfilling the mission of promoting exports, we must pay attention to the following:

Positively taking the initiative in expanding the credit activities to serve the development of production, the promotion of state purchasing, and the concentration of sources of export goods.

For several years now, when furthering the advance of the credit reform the banking sector has promulgated many legal documents regarding the credit investment directions and policies during the new period, and professional credit regulations, systems, and measures. That is a favorable condition for the strong development of the task of using credit to serve the economic activities in general and the export activities in particular.

The requirement now being posed for the investment of bank credit to serve the development of production and the promotion of exports is to organize economic studies to correctly determine the subjects requiring capital

investment. Within the framework of overall studies, a very practical and important matter regarding the process of promoting borrowing is that the bank must positively participate in drafting and reviewing the plans for organizing the production of each export product. That is a new requirement, but one that is very essential.

For a long time now, a considerable number of base-level banks have been in a passive status when making loans to serve export activities. Therefore, lending is usually carried out in one of two ways: either being mechanical and bureaucratic when lending capital, especially when the borrowing unit must make expenditures in cash; or lending in a haphazard, patchwork method, with the credit work limited to the lending of capital and not having a positive effect in serving production and promoting exports. After the production areas and the quantity of materials that may be set aside for export have been determined, and especially after the directions for developing the specific products of each area or each production base have been determined to be realistic and scientific, the bank will be prepared to expand its investment activities. With regard to the production activities serving exports, the principal feature of the bank's credit policy is to concentrate capital on expanding lending and giving priority to fully and promptly meeting the credit capital needs for fixed property and mobile property in order to help the enterprises producing export goods, the bases purchasing export goods, the state agricultural, forestry, and fishing bases, the collective economic organizations engaged in production activities which serve exports, etc, so that they can strengthen the material-technical bases, improve their equipment and machinery, expand their scale of production and commerce, and do a good job of fulfilling the production plans and the norms for export goods which must be delivered. In addition to promoting lending, it is necessary to promptly and fully meet the capital requirements of production which serves exports. Bank credit contributes effectively to developing the strengths of each region and locality. Credit capital must be concentrated in the areas that have been planned, in concentrated, specialized production areas which serve exports and are capable of creating rich, stable sources of high-value goods.

In addition to expanding lending to serve production and create plentiful sources of export goods, attention is also paid to investing bank credit in processing. Investing strongly in the processing industries, including industries which warehouse the agricultural exports, is an important direction of bank credit's service to export activities. That is also in accord with the current legal documents regarding the division of responsibility between the granting of funds from the state budget and credit investment. All the export goods processing bases managed by the foreign trade or the other sectors, and everything from investment in capital construction to production, are the objects of bank credit. In expanding credit to serve the development of the export goods processing industry, the bank both pays attention to helping the existing bases expand their scale of production

and change and improve their equipment, and encourages lending to build new bases with modern technical equipment, in order to improve the quality of exports.

According to the specific object of credit investment, the capital that is lent may be domestic capital or it may be capital borrowed from foreign countries, which is lent in the form of foreign currency to the enterprises and economic units engaged directly in producing, processing, or supplying export goods for which the Foreign Trade Bank supplies capital and the loan applications of which are reviewed and managed by the local bank branches.

Another direction of the Bank's credit activities to contribute to the promotion of exports is to encourage lending to serve the requirements of developing the contracted manufacturing of export goods. At present, many countries want to develop contracted-out relationships with our country, and the variety of such goods could be very great. According to the contracted-out agreements signed between our country's foreign trade organizations and foreign countries, credit investment may be made in many different forms.

The Foreign Trade Bank lends foreign exchange to the foreign trade organizations so that they can import raw materials from the contracting-out party when such relationships call for the purchasing of raw materials and the selling of finished products.

The local State Bank units will lend the bases directly engaged in contracted-out production Vietnamese money to spend during the process of contracted-out production (such as loans for vocational training, for the advance payment of contracted-out labor expenses, etc).

The important condition for developing contracted-out export goods production is the constructing of material-technical bases in order to expand contracting-out relationships. Here the role of bank credit invested in fixed property, both horizontally and vertically, must be strongly developed. According to the type of equipment, the bank is prepared to expand the lending of both domestic capital and capital borrowed from abroad.

Doing a good job of lending for the purchasing and concentration of goods is an important requirement of the bank's credit activities which serve the promotion of exports. Most of the goods set aside for export are produced and supplied by the state and collective enterprises and production bases. As the revolution in production relationships makes progress, the quantity of goods the state must purchase from the private production bases will gradually decrease. However, under the present conditions, especially in the southern provinces, when the economy still includes individual production components and the collective production form is still at a low level, and when the state economic sector, especially in the

sphere of agriculture, forestry, and fishing, does not yet have conditions for strong development, the purchasing and concentration of individually produced goods for export still cannot be regarded lightly. The actual situation demonstrates that one of the reasons why some localities and bases producing export goods, or units doing export business often do not attain the plan norms regarding the delivery or production of export goods, or why the export index is low, is that they have not done a good job of purchasing and concentrating goods and have had a shortage of cash.

There are two types of state purchases in export activities: the purchasing of materials and raw materials for the enterprises and bases producing and processing export goods, and the purchasing of finished products for export. The first type of state purchasing is the more important, and the ratio purchased from the private and individual producers is still great. There are still problems in the state purchasing of export goods which must be resolved by many sectors. A rather widespread problem in many localities that is directly related to the responsibility of the bank is providing cash with which to purchase export goods, especially in the southern provinces. The correct way to resolve that problem is to take the viewpoint of serving the common interest, and have a proper and truly objective attitude. On the basis of the bank's stands and policies regarding credit and money for export activities, each relevant local bank branch must review its operations, and the bank must guide its branches in correcting the things they have been doing wrong.

In the lending of cash for the purchasing of export goods, applications must be weighed and appropriate priorities must be given to the different requirements. Of course, the purchasing of export goods cannot be carried out at any price even when payments are made by transferring accounts. Making comparisons and assigning priorities in lending cash for the purchasing of export goods reflects the bank's flexibility in meeting the cash expenditures of the purchasing units. For example, if for one reason or another the plan norms regarding cash purchasing, including supplementary plan norms, have not yet been approved but the quantity of goods that must be purchased is judged to be rational and necessary to meet export requirements, the bank may approve the norm for the purchasing and concentration of goods in order to promptly serve exports, and not make one excuse or another to refuse the application. Care in considering applications for loans of cash to purchase export goods is also manifested in examining and managing purchase prices. For example, the prices for the same product differ from place to place and from time to time for many reasons, such as the seasonal nature of goods, the unorganized nature of the private market, the urgent need for goods which must be delivered promptly to meet the terms of foreign commercial contracts, etc. In such cases, if the bank adheres to rigid, fixed principles in making cash loans to purchasing units, that will clearly create obstacles for the overall work. In giving priority to cash loans for the purchase of export goods, it is true that some local bank units have lacked cash at a time when there was

much demand for it, so they have limited themselves to secondary requests for cash to purchase export goods, or have not taken positive steps to help the purchasing organizations meet the plan norms.

We must do a good job of serving the export goods settlement relationships between the foreign trade organizations and the goods-supplying units.

On the basis of economic contracts to purchase outright and export goods from the production, processing or exploitation bases, purchasing at the various places in our country is the responsibility of the import-export general corporations and corporations, for sale to foreign buyers.

The import-export organizations have maintained their economic contract relationships for the purchasing of export goods which they signed directly with the goods-selling units in our country, which are as follows:

The import-export general corporations sign purchasing contracts directly with each base with regard to export goods produced by the enterprise combines and the central-level state enterprises and bases.

The legal basis on which the various parties establish economic contract relationships are the state plan norms regarding the production and supplying of export goods which have been assigned to the managing sectors and each unit. Such units sell export goods to the foreign trade sector in large quantities and on a broad scale.

The export goods produced by the local state enterprises and bases (managed by the provincial or district echelons), and by the collective economic organizations (the agricultural production cooperatives and the artisan industry-handicrafts cooperatives or teams). As for goods purchased from individuals, the import-export general corporations sign contracts to purchase goods with the provincial and municipal corporations dealing in export goods. The legal basis on which the parties form economic contract relations are the state plan norms regarding the delivery of export goods that have been assigned to each province and to each municipality directly under the central echelon.

Furthermore, in the foreign trade sector there are some enterprises and bases producing or processing export goods which are directly under the export corporations. Those units also have economic contract relationships to sell goods outright to the export-import general corporations.

Thus, the scope of the in-country units which supply export goods for the internal trade sector on the basis of economic contracts includes practically the whole country. And in settling accounts the local State Bank branches, as the selling parties, will be used as the sources of support, as banks which serve the sellers. On the other hand, the foreign trade organizations fulfilling foreign commerce missions are the parties purchasing export goods and are also part of the system directly served and managed by the Vietnam Foreign Trade Bank.

Whether the export goods settlement relations between the foreign trade sector and the in-country bases are implemented well or not is determined first of all by the buying and selling parties themselves. However, the role of the banks directly serving them is extremely important. That role is manifested in two ways: as the settlement center for the national economy, the bank must guide and stimulate the economic units in the correct implementation of settlements. By means of professional settlement services combined with banking services, it contributes positively by encouraging the parties to sign economic contracts regarding the delivery of export goods and strictly live up to the contracts that have been signed. Furthermore, the bank, as a service organ, must handle correctly, accurately and promptly, all services regarding export-import settlements entrusted to it by the buying and selling parties.

In the export goods settlement relationships between the export-import general corporations and the producing and purchasing units there are a number of problems which must be overcome:

The application of the settlement forms and formulas is not yet appropriate, but is restricted to a few settlement forms which are easy for the banks to implement; they pay little attention to the economic contents of their service. That is not to mention instances in many localities in which the methods and conditions of goods delivery do not vary very much, but the form of settlement differs from place to place. Some places use the form of authorizing expenditures, other places rely on payments in advance, while others maintain checkbooks without limits.

That situation has had the overall effect of the in-country parties supplying export goods usually being paid slowly. In fact, in some instances goods have been shipped abroad and foreign exchange has been paid to the Foreign Trade Bank, but the in-country goods-selling party complains that it has not been paid by the Bank (by means of bank drafts). At times the special loan accounts for export goods opened by the export-import general corporations at the Foreign Trade Bank sometimes show a surplus! What causes that situation? Viewed objectively, we see that the in-country goods-selling parties have received payments slowly not because the foreign trade organizations which purchased the export goods encounter difficulties regarding funds, for all export money the foreign trade sector must pay to the in-country bases are part of the credit capital lent on a short-term basis by the Foreign Trade Bank, "for the budgeting and circulation of export goods." An all-encompassing reason is that "the settlement system does not make use of cash and makes loans for settlements," according to Decision No 70/NH-QP, dated 27 September 1975, of the Governor General of the Vietnam State Bank. That decision has not been fully understood by the economic units (especially the units operating in the southern provinces) and there are some which have not yet seen that document! Furthermore, with regard to the local state bank branches the basic contents of that system have not been fully understood by all cadres, especially since they come

into contact with export activities, which have their special characteristics. Therefore, a considerable number of bank units are confused when guiding the buying and selling parties in selecting appropriate settlement formulas and forms.

Another aspect of the export goods settlement relationships between the foreign trade sector and the in-country bases that must be discussed is the legal transfer of goods ownership from the selling party to the buying party (the export-import general corporations), which has not been clearly determined by legal documents. Therefore, settlements have often been arbitrary and not appropriate to the nature of goods circulation. Specifically, the foreign trade sector purchases export goods from the in-country supply units at production at the warehouse of the sellers. Therefore, in principle, the legal transfer of ownership from the selling party to the buying party must be done at the warehouse of the seller. When the goods change hands, the seller of course has the right to demand payment, and the buyer has the obligation of making payment. With regard to the circulation of goods, after the legal transfer of ownership all problems that arise regarding the goods or expenses (such as expenditures to ship the goods to the international shipping-receiving points, such as railroad stations, ports, etc.) are the responsibility of the purchasing party. That is in accord with the actual situation, for expenses incurred from the warehouse of the in-country seller their shipment overseas are part of the foreign trade circulation expenses. But the method of settlement is different. There is a regulation that the export goods of the provinces under the responsibility of the local export-import corporations must be sent to the railway depots and seaports which are international shipping points (of course, transportation expenses that are part of the foreign trade circulation expenses are usually included in the production costs of export goods), and after the representatives of the purchasing party at the depots and ports have completed paperwork to receive the goods (invoice, verification, etc) the monetary payment procedure begins. From that we may conclude that in exporting foreign trade circulation begins when the goods are delivered in our country, while the monetary capital reflecting the operation of the circulation of goods only "appears" near the end of the circulation phase of exports. In other words, when export goods begin the circulation process, foreign trade expenses are paid from funds for in-country circulation, or even for the production phase, not by the actual capital of foreign trade circulation.

The above situation demonstrates that export goods settlements between the export-import general corporations and the units which supply export goods in our country are complicated and require full and deep study. If each side is to fully understand them seminars should be held on export goods settlement between the relevant sectors and decisions, statutes, rules, and regulations regarding that matter must be promptly promulgated. In the immediate future, in order to do a good job of settling export goods accounts between the foreign trade sector and the in-country bases, and the

bank units serving the selling parties and the buying parties must coordinate closely and exchange experiences in order to promptly overcome the remaining problems and deficiencies in their operations. There must be coordination among the bank and foreign trade echelons, and among the relevant sectors.

We must do a better job of settling foreign payments for export goods: After our foreign trade organizations have completed the paperwork involved in turning over goods to foreign buyers (via international transportation facilities), an important task that must be accomplished is collecting payment for the goods. Of course, since goods are exported to many different markets the methods of payment also differ. No matter to which country the goods are exported, and no matter what the method of payment is, a very strict requirement that is always posed for those engaged in foreign payments work for the foreign trade sector and the bank is to assure security in the making of payments and take skillful measures to prevent problems regarding foreign exchange which could cause losses for us. In daily payment transactions, the various tasks must be performed urgently and accurately. After export goods have been delivered, the certification of payment certificates within the foreig trade sector and from the foreign trade organizations to the bank (via the Vietnam Foreign Trade Bank) must be complete and uninterrupted. On that basis, the Foreign Trade Bank is responsible for doing the international payments paperwork in order to collect the money owed. That also has an important significance in the case of goods exported to capitalist markets. If payments are slow, even by a few days, for a lot of goods valued at 100,000 dollars, for example, that will cost the state hundreds of dollars in interest on the foreign exchange that is sent. That is not to mention the fact that in our country's present condition, because our foreign exchange is very great at times we must borrow money on a short-term basis, or are forced to issue drafts that are greater than the sums sent abroad, and must pay high overdraft interest.

In export activities, the receipt of payment is the last step in the foreign exchange settlement process, and is very important. Therefore, in addition to promoting exports we must do a better job of collecting payments. Especially in the present situation, when the capitalist world is experiencing an increasingly serious monetary crisis, we must cope with many complicated problems in the foreign settlements work in general and export settlements specifically, and the resolution of those problems requires agility and flexibility. To perform those tasks well, we must always be aware of the contents of commercial contracts signed by our foreign trade organizations and foreign buyers, promptly uncover irrationalities in the conditions regarding monetary and settlement matters, and help the commercial units with regard to selecting the kind of currency and setting prices in commercial contracts; the types of insurance covering foreign transactions and the contents of specific articles in commercial contracts to assure payment of foreign exchange; conditions regarding settlement certificates; conditions regarding the times and places for

making settlements and demanding payment; the types of settlement that must be applied, etc.

The activities of the State Bank relevant to the tasks of developing production and promoting production are very varied and numerous. We have only dealt in a fundamental way with some of the main problems. We hope that you will pay attention to those problems and exchange opinions in order to throw more light on them.

5616
CSO: 4209

DEVELOPMENT OF SHORT-TERM CROPS FOR EXPORT URGED

Hanoi NGOAI THUONG [FOREIGN TRADE] in Vietnamese No 1, Jan 79 pp 18-19

[Article by Pham Thinh: "Develop Short-Term Agricultural Crops, Rapidly Increase Sources of Export Goods"]

[Text] Bananas, pineapples, watermelons, jute, peanuts, rush, castor-oil plants, tobacco, sesame, beans, millet, garlic, peppers, ginger, saffron, onions, etc, are short-term crops the production of which may be developed and the export of which may be stepped up.

With regard to the crops which our people have long been accustomed to, and experienced in growing, there have naturally been formed such areas as the gold-leaf tobacco area in Cao Lang, the jute area in Hai Hung, the rush areas in Thanh Hoa, Thai Binh, and Ha Nam Ninh, the peanut areas in Nghe Tinh, Ha Bac, Tay Ninh, and Song Be, the banana areas in Vinh Phu, Ben Tre, and Cuu Long, the pineapple areas in Vinh Phu and Long An, the onion areas in Thuan Hai and Lam Dong, etc.

In general, those crops do not take up much staple food land, and their growing periods are short. Except for jute and peanuts, those crops may be interplanted during the winter season or planted after rice and subsidiary food crops have been harvested. Some crops, such as beans, sesame, etc, may be grown on land planted in industrial crops during the first few years (in areas growing tea, coffee, rubber, etc). Some crops, such as millet, onions, etc, are very suitable for sandy soil along the coast, and provide high yields. The growing and processing of most of those crops do not require much capital, they do not require much tending, and mature rapidly. Their products are in demand all over our country and have high export value. They are in great demand on the world market and have strong foreign exchange-earning potential, especially such processed products as canned fruits and vegetables, frozen fruits and vegetables, peanut oil, castor oil, etc.

Therefore, beginning now there must be positive and special policies and measures to rapidly create many such products for export, including processed products.

First of all, in addition to launching a broad movement among the people to grow and process such crops as beans, sesame, millet, peppers, ginger, and dried saffron, it is necessary to rapidly draw up plans to form areas for the concentrated cultivation of export crops, in order to create favorable conditions for investing in, providing equipment for, processing, and mobilizing export goods.

In the provinces of Ben Tre, Tien Giang, Hau Giang, Cuu Long, and Vinh Phu it is possible to develop banana growing on areas of between 15,000 and 20,000 hectares.

About 30,000 hectares of hilly land and acidic and saline land in the provinces of Long An, Kien Giang, Minh Hai, Tien Giang, Hau Giang, Quang Nam-Danang, Nghia Binh, Ha Nam Ninh, Ha Son Binh, and Vinh Phu may be used to grow pineapples.

Jute can be planted on 50,000 to 60,000 hectares of land in the provinces of Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Hai Phong, Ha Nam Ninh, Thanh Hoa, Long An, Dong Thap, Hau Giang, and An Giang.

It is possible to develop rush growing on 20,000 to 25,000 hectares in Thai Binh, Ha Nam Ninh, Hai Phong, Thanh Hoa, Minh Hai, Ho Chi Minh City, and Binh Thi Thien, and 50,000 to 70,000 hectares of peanuts may be grown in Ha Bac, Ha Nam Ninh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe Tinh, Tay Ninh, Song Be, Quang Da, Nghia Binh, Gia Lai, Cong Tum, and Dac Lac.

In Cao Lang, Vinh Phu, Ha Son Binh, Thuan Hai, Gia Kong, Song Be, etc, it is possible to grow 20,000 to 30,000 hectares of tobacco.

Onions may be grown on a large scale in Thuan Hai, Nghia Binh, and Lam Dong.

Between 30,000 and 50,000 hectares of beans, millet, and sesame may be grown in the coastal areas from Nghe Tinh to Thuan Hai, and in the Tay Nguyen area.

Saffron, ginger, and peppers may be grown mainly in the northern part of the southern region, and in the provinces of Zone 4 and Zone 5.

Secondly, there must be at the same time a policy of promptly investing in material bases in the following ways:

With regard to processing, investment must be made to build and equip a number of additional freezing and canning installations, networks of cool, refrigerated warehouses for use in processing and storing vegetables and fruits, networks of drying sheds (to dry tobacco and vegetables), oil-pressing installations, etc.

With regard to transportation facilities, it is necessary to provide additional trucks, railroad cars, barges, boats, and containers, especially

refrigerated vehicles. We must urgently dredge channels and build a number of specialized port areas in Tra Noc, Vinh Long, Quy Nhon, and Da Nang for the export of vegetables and fruits.

With regard to seeds and fertilizer, steps must be taken to assure that there are sufficient seeds, and it is necessary to improve a number of varieties so that they provide high yields (pineapples, tobacco, rush, etc). It is especially important to provide sufficient seeds for the large, recently developed areas. We must increase the production of chemical fertilizer and animal manure to keep pace with the crop development plans by increasing the output of the existing phosphate and nitrogenous fertilizer plants, importing additional fertilizer, and developing the raising of large farm animals to increase the amount of manure.

With regard to packaging, that is one of the important sectors and must receive special attention. Otherwise, we will encounter many difficulties and be in a passive position, and the quantity of goods mobilized for production will be limited. There are various kinds of packaging: wood, cartons, bottles and jars, stainless steel bamboo, wrapping paper, etc. Immediate steps must be taken to develop the paper processing industry, the glass industry, and the paper carton industry, and exploit and process wood, bamboo, etc, in order to serve the above requirements.

Third, there must be policies to stimulate exports, including material incentive policies toward the places which go all-out to produce their own staple food and set aside land to grow export crops.

We must make studies in order to quickly readjust and promulgate a number of state purchasing prices, so that they can be appropriate to the production bases, in order to increase incomes to the maximum for the people who directly produce the products and create many high-quality export goods. We must expand short-term credit and create advantageous conditions for the development of the production bases.

Under the light of the resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee, the resolution of the Fourth Session of the Sixth National Assembly, and the 1979 state plan, we hope that in drafting their plans the sectors and localities can find ways to strongly develop the crops for which they have many capabilities, in order to rapidly increase the supply of export goods during the present year.

5616
CSO: 4209

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

INCREASED EXPORT OF TRADE TOOLS URGED

Hanoi NGOAI THUONG [FOREIGN TRADE] in Vietnamese No 1, Jan 79 pp 24-25 & 29

[Article by Nam Ha: "On Organizing the Production and Export of Trade Tools"]

[Text] There are many kinds of trade tools: the tool sets used in the work-study schools, the tools used to make electrical, automotive, and machinery repairs, etc. To date, there are about 50,000 kinds of tools in all. Due to the requirements of the users as well as the producers, and because they want to increase their foreign exchange earnings, many countries exporting machinery and transportation facilities include tool kits. But because of the international division of labor, and in order to earn maximum profits, each country has a different method of operation. Many countries that are highly developed industrially concentrate on the production of high-value, high-technology items, and do not want to produce such things as trade tools, which require much labor and are not very profitable but which are very much in demand. There are also countries which produce such tools as pliers, socket wrenches, monkey wrenches, files, screwdrivers, etc, but when we import their machinery we see that the tool kits they sent along contain only tools that our country produces. Therefore, attention is being paid to organizing the production and export of tools, especially in tne countries with favorable conditions.

In our country, with regard to organizing the production and export of such items there are many opinions that must be exchanged, especially those regarding the necessity for such items, the advantages, the difficulties, and the problems that will have to be solved in the present and in the future.

In 1979, because of our difficult situation regarding foreign exchange our party and state adopted the policy of "endeavoring to step up exports," while also "calculating our import requirements very closely." First of all, we must fully exploit the latent capabilities of our country and rapidly increase our ability to provide our own raw materials, materials machinery and spare parts. We definitely must not import materials which we can replace with others obtainable within our country. We must take

the initiative in drafting production, construction, and consumption plans which correspond to our import capabilities.*

In that regard, we must clearly realize that that policy was adopted not only because of foreign exchange difficulties but also because of our viewpoint of constructing an independent, autonomous economy by exploiting all latent capabilities of our country, furthering the development of the production forces, and consolidating the socialist production relationships that have been and are being formed in both parts of our country.

In actuality, there are two bases on which we can promote the production and export of trade tools: our production capabilities and the requirements of the world market.

During the past several years we have exported increasingly larger quantities of tools. In 1975 we exported 30,000 items, in 1977 we exported 150,000, and in 1978 we exported 500,000. The bases participating in the production of trade tools for export include state enterprises, machinery cooperatives, and even agricultural cooperatives. Since 1976, the Da Nang Equipment Enterprise in Hai Phong has delivered tens of thousands of items for export. In 1977, the Yen Do cooperative in Binh Luc District, Ha Nam Ninh Province produced 230,000 files of the various types; in 1978 it produced 500,000, and in 1979 it will increase its output to 1 million items. Most of the tools we produce and export are made from steel produced by the Gia Sang steel-rolling mill. A number of production bases have found technical processes that are appropriate to the capabilities of artisan industry and semi-mechanized equipment, and to our skills and raw materials capabilities. In general, our exported trade tools have begun to meet the export specifications and quality requirements.

On the world market at present, there are favorable conditions for the export of trade tools. Some developed industrial nations with high technical levels and a shortage of labor have gradually reduced the production scale of such products. Therefore, market requirements are tending to increase while competition is declining. Each year the Polish market requires 100 million pairs of pliers. Some countries require shovels, pitchforks, files, screwdrivers, etc. The Hong Kong market requires many electrical pliers.

Those requirements, conditions, and capabilities are favorable bases on which to promote our production and export of trade tools.

But in order to produce large quantities with high quality and meet the requirements of the market, in our present economic circumstances two questions are posed: What must we do and how must we do it?

---

* Excerpt from the Council of Ministers' report on the tasks of the 1979 state plan delivered by Comrade Le Thanh Nghi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National Assembly.

In order to have large quantities, we must resolve the problems of investment, production planning, and specific measures that are appropriate to our circumstances.

The experiences of some countries and our own experience demonstrate that in order to export large quantities of such goods, like other products, they will have to undergo a process of experimentation in order to determine the market needs, the technological processes, and economic effectiveness. That process is also one of simultaneously producing and seeking investment. The rate and scale of investment depend on the effectiveness of production and exports. In the struggle on the economic-technical front, nations that find appropriate technical processes, invest the least capital, and are the first to market products will have many advantages in competition on the market. Production planning and the carrying out of specialization and cooperativization are gradually determined in the process of production.

Having posed the question in that manner, we believe that in 1979 and for several years to come, in order to contribute to increasing the output and improving the quality of exported trade goods we must and can take the following specific measures:

1. We must initially use domestic raw materials. For example, type C50 steel, which is being produced by our Gia Sang steel-rolling mill.

2. We must concentrate on the production and export of such products as tool sets for use in work-study schools, tools for electrical and automotive repair equipment, which are products for which we have found appropriate technical processes.

3. We must cooperate with other countries in many forms, such as receiving raw materials, using labor in our country, organizing production, and delivering products.

4. There must be close coordination with the organs distributing materials, and we must give priority in the distribution of materials to the bases producing trade tools for export. In the immediate future they must be given priority in the distribution of good steel to make molds for the production of such products.

5. Under the present conditions, the state enterprises and the collective economy must work together. The management organs will draft plans and gradually achieve specialization and cooperativization on the basis of the specific results.

6. In order to provide labor, there must be plans to exploit the latent capabilities of the work-study schools, and self-training plans must be drafted. We must organize official visits and exchange experiences regarding technical process.

7. Trade tools both have the nature of production tools and consumer goods, so the production bases and the foreign trade organs must pay attention to the quality of goods and packaging in order to promptly satisfy the utilization requirements and improve the products' appearance. In that regard, the Sundry Goods Export-Import General Corporation has been assigned by the state the mission of dealing in trade tools, and must supply the necessary samples and technical data. We must promptly discover which production bases are doing a good job so that many other places can study their experiences.

In order to stimulate the improvement of product quality, during the recent period the Hanoi Equipment Enterprise has paid its workers a bonus of .05 dong for each monkey wrench that meets export standards.

The above are some of the initial experiences regarding the production and export of trade tools. We hope that many people engaged in commerce, production, and management contribute opinions about a product which we believe we can improve quantitatively and qualitatively in the immediate future and in coming years.

5616
CSO: 4209

IDEAS OFFERED ABOUT ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN TRADE STATIONS

Hanoi NGOAI THUONG [FOREIGN TRADE] in Vietnamese No 5, May 79
pp 19-22, 24

[Exchange of Opinions & Experiences column by Vu Huu Tuu: "About Activities of Foreign Trade Stations at District Level"]

[Excerpts] In stepping up our country's export, purchasing goods for export is of great importance. This job is done by a network of organizations that mobilizes the materials for export. This network is widespread and covers from central to local level: at the central level, there are general corporations and corporations for export-import; in provinces and municipalities, local foreign trade corporations; in districts and cities, foreign trade purchasing stations. In this organizational network, foreign trade purchasing stations play the role of assault soldiers being directly involved in exploiting the potential resources and manpower in districts in order to get the sources of goods for export.

Like combatants in combat formation, foreign trade purchasing stations must be the subject of clear-cut definition of organization, role and method of operation. Only with such a definition can they be made capable of fulfilling the task of creating the sources of export goods in large volumes and with high values in order to boost our country's ability to maintain economic cooperation with other countries.

In this article, we want to present some ideas about the matters mentioned above and wish they are considered ideas of consultative nature.

About the function of purchasing export goods:

What is meant by purchasing? By its real definition, this word means only buying a large volume of goods. But the act of purchasing is called by different names, depending on its purposes and nature.

On the basis of its purposes, we can divide the purchasing job into three categories: purchasing for building up reserves, purchasing for production and wholesale purchasing.

- Purchasing to build up reserves serves either national reserves or reserves of enterprises.

- Purchasing for production (including processing): In this case, the act of purchasing is a bridge linking two productive sectors together.

- Purchasing for circulation is purchasing to be followed by wholesale or retail selling (people call this job wholesale purchase). In this case, the act of purchasing is a bridge linking production with circulation in the social production process.

Purchasing by foreign trade purchasing stations is both wholesale purchase and purchase for production. Some goods can be gathered for immediate delivery to general corporations or corporations for import-export for selling to other countries; other goods must go through subsequent processing in localities. For instance, rush (for the making of mats, handbags, rugs), rattan and bamboo (used as raw materials for woven articles), etc.

As they purchase goods for production, because of the characteristics of this job, purchasing stations must have reserve stocks to ensure regularity and continuity of production and processing.

Depending on its effects on production, we can consider purchasing either passive or active.

Passive purchasing is purchasing based on the existing achievements of traditional productive sectors and on traditional lines of goods, with the scope remaining unchanged.

Active purchasing is one that includes, in addition to buying goods, organizing sources of supplied goods, developing production installations, making new lines of goods; in addition to consolidating the existing goods-supplying installations and maintaining the existing lines of goods, further developing the goods-supplying installations, finding and making new lines of goods and making purchases more abundant in terms of varieties and in greater quantities everyday.

Purchases of goods for export by foreign trade purchasing stations, with their socialist nature, are always made on the basis of equal prices and in the spirit of socialist cooperation and mutual assistance between the purchasing and producing parties so as to promote development for all. Le Thanh Nghi, member of the VCP Central Committee Political Bureau and deputy premier, in a government report read at the 2nd session of the 6th National Assembly, pointed to the need that "commercial work (including both domestic and foreign trade -- note by Vu Huu Tuu) be founded on serving and promoting the development of production in order to get the sources of goods." As a result, purchases made by foreign trade stations must be active and creative. Their function is not limited to buying goods but must also include organizing and encouraging production development and finding new lines and sources of goods in order to help develop production in the field of their activities.

In short, to fulfill their function, foreign trade purchasing stations must not only buy goods to supply for export but also maintain reserve stocks, study ways to find new lines and sources of goods and contribute to stepping up production and the new division of labor in the area assigned to them.

In some localities, the leadership organs do not pay enough attention to these stations, which they consider as any other organizations and in which they show little interest. This fact causes considerable hindrance to their activities in some specific cases. For instance, when consideration is needed for allocation of capital, expenditure, land; when the norms are to be set for stocks; in the evaluation of their commercial activities, etc.

About organization of these stations:

A question many people have discussed is the conditions under which a foreign trade purchasing station is established. The opinions are of two kinds:

The first opinion wants to use the prospective turnover of a station as the basis for deciding about its establishment. In other words, according to this opinion, a station is established only where large quantities of goods can be purchased and the value of purchases is considerable.

Although this opinion attaches great importance to economic accounting, it is not a total one because in the first place it considers the effect before the cause -- how can the quantities of goods to be purchased be known even before the station exists and there are people to organize the buying? In the second place, this opinion is based only on passive purchasing and not on the active nature of socialist purchasing, nor the subjective activity of the stations.

The second kind of opinion wants to establish stations on the basis of administrative units (districts or cities). According to this opinion, every district or city must have a station that buys goods for export.

A short while back, this opinion was not considered a right one yet, for at that time its proponents had not carefully considered the economic effectiveness of organization building.

Today the situation has changed. In the light of the resolutions of the Fourth VCP Congress, districts are where "all relationships between the state and farmers in the fields of production, circulation and distribution" are achieved and have all become agriculture-industry economic units or agriculture-forestry-industry economic units.

The overall structure of agriculture-industry at the district level is conceived as having a machine industry, repair stations, electric power, communications and transportation, processing installations, research

installations and developed agriculture, forestry and fishery. With such a structure, is it possible that the foreign trade organization at the district level cannot find the lines of goods for export to purchase?

Moreover, with some manpower liberated from the fields thanks to a higher degree of mechanization in agriculture, the districts' leadership organs are also seeking a way to develop additional occupations and to carry out the party's directive, namely, "All sectors, localities and production installations must do their very best to step up the production of goods for export and consider that an extremely important task in the 5-year plan they must fulfill." In this situation, foreign trade purchasing stations come into being as organs that direct the development of sectors and occupations producing goods for export at the district level.

Thus, in the new stage, the establishment in every district of a foreign trade purchasing station obviously is a need of the locality. However, the question is what should be the size of these stations and their staff.

Some people say that manpower in the stations is excessively large. But on the contrary, according to our own survey, we have found that:

1. Most stations have not yet fulfilled their function in terms of studying the organization of sources of goods, finding new sources of goods and contributing to a redivision of labor in the districts.

2. A good many professional cadres in district-level foreign trade purchasing stations still do not like research work and rather prefer to "run around" (to do routine work), as they are not trained to suitably conduct economic studies, even within a narrow scope.

3. In many stations, management of manpower and cadres still remains loose, as their leading cadres do not know how to assign work to members of their staff.

As the function is not yet fulfilled properly, the fact that cadres do not work efficiently or are not organized to work efficiently shows an actual shortage of well-qualified cadres and a lack of strict manpower management rather than an excessively large staff.

However, in our opinion, to set the common size of staff for all stations is a difficult thing to do. The staff, as well as the size, of any station must depend on its turnover and the volume of work it has to do. Right after its establishment, its planning and professional components can be merged into one team; its storing and wrapping-packing components can be only one team. The initial staff can number 5-7 people. Later when the value of purchases grows and the volume of work increases, a component can split into 2-3 teams, the staff can number up to a few dozens, etc.

Furthermore, where purchases are seasonal, the manpower of a station can vary through the months: during the busy season of purchase, the foreign

trade corporation of the province can send some staff members to a station to provide temporary reinforcement and withdraw them at the end of the busy season.

In short, in our opinion, the necessary development trend will eventually lead to the establishment in every district of a foreign trade organization, which can be called the export station of the district. On the basis of the volume of work, value of purchases and lines of goods the station deals with, it is necessary to determine the proper size of its staff, with cadres being well-qualified and capable of doing the work. Only then can the station fulfill the task of conducting both its business and studies, both making purchases and serving as staff for the district VCP committee in terms of providing guidance for development and production of goods for export.

About business activities of these stations:

The purchasing of goods for export is the common task of many foreign trade business organizations. But in order to avoid duplication of their activities, the Ministry of Foreign Trade has issued directives to draw some boundary lines for the purchasing relationships:

- According to Circular No 441/BNgT/XK of 17 December 1973, the general corporations and corporations for export-import cannot deal with cooperatives and production teams of any kinds; in all of their economic relationships with these installations, they must go through the local foreign trade corporations.

- According to Circular No 57/BNgT/XK of 17 March 1975, all purchasing relationships between the general corporations and corporations for export-import on the one hand and local state enterprises on the other must go through the local foreign trade corporations.

Thus the extent of purchasing relationships the local foreign trade corporations have covers the local state enterprises, cooperatives, artisan industrial and handicraft production teams, individuals and farmer households. The representative of the local foreign trade corporation at the district level is the district export station.

However, the scope of business of the stations sometimes is restricted because of different reasons, such as doing brotherhood duties, conducting research, purchasing special goods, etc. Sometimes the violation of business boundaries has brought about adverse consequences.

To apply the economic accounting system to the stations' activities, we must perfect the purchase price system and at the same time improve the method of calculating circulation expenses and standard profit. We think that for the time being, in the case of some lines of goods, the purchase prices do not reflect as yet the amount of social labor expended for the

production of goods for export, which are the kinds of goods being made according to more accurate specifications and being of better quality than the goods for domestic consumption. As to the calculation of circulation expenses and standard profit, since the calculating method is far from scientific, sometimes it does not encourage organizing purchases and increasing business profit by reducing circulation expenses and causes unfavorable consequences instead.

In short, for quite a long time to come, our sector still has to be in charge of purchasing goods for export. To properly organize this purchasing job, in addition to building specialized business stations and consolidating local foreign trade units, what is immediately needed is, in our opinion, to organize, consolidate and develop the district stations. To do so, we must strengthen the economic accounting of these stations, find for them an appropriate method of operation and help them to fight the signs of any violation of the division of labor in business.

We have just boldly offered some ideas. We hope to receive many ideas for an exchange of opinions on this matter.

5598
CSO: 4209

SHORTCOMINGS IN FOOD MANAGEMENT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Feb 80 p 3

[Readers Opinion Column: "Shortcomings in the Work of Food Management"]

[Text] In the past year, the food and food product sector has had many positive measures in the area of food management, increased inspection of warehouses, and education of selling personnel, which have helped to recover for the State a significant amount of food losses due to false declarations or illegal "connections." At the same time, strict discipline actions have been taken in the case of a number of bad elements who "like the egrets take advantage of the clouded waters" in order to steal our socialist property.

Through a number of inspection drives, it is revealed that a number of localities still display many shortcomings in the management link, which is why the food is stolen or registers losses and disappearances. The Food Office of Bac Giang municipality (Ha Bac Province) discovered that the Ha Bac chemical assembly plant violated the food policies and uses its food allocations in desultory and wasteful manner. The office has recovered almost 9,000 kilograms of rice (rice going to workers who have since joined the army, rice stored for no obvious reason, rice listed to the name of workers who have since left, etc.). In the province of Gia Lai - Kontum it is the same thing: The Dac Dua agricultural farm in Mang Giang district declared an increase in population but after inspection has had to return 1,200 kilograms of illegally used rice (sold to the outside) to the state; the state-run rubber plantation of Chu Prong had to return 14,000 kilograms. At the Co Long new economic zone, the food stored in its warehouse for no good reason was found to be as much as 17,900 kilograms after inspection. The Hoa Binh port which received rice sent by the Hai Phong delivery company found its rice missing or spoiled up to 80 tons. The XG36 barge of the Enterprise 208 lost 571 bags of rice of the 50-kilogram variety. The situation of commodity losses is extremely serious.

To manage well the food belonging to the State, we propose that the food services urgently make the supply link conform with the principles, sta-

tutes and policies regulating this function, that they stress regular inspection of the organs, enterprises, work sites and units that are entitled to a good deal of food. Every month, there must be concrete accounting made and closing of accounts done together with the organs responsible for the management of food. Strict discipline must be dealt out in the case of those transportation units that lose their goods on the way or come with missing goods. The G-type barges which are good for transporting iron and steel should not be allowed to transport food since their construction is not made for adequate protection. It is to be hoped with urgency that the public security sector combines with the local authorities to watch even more closely the food management area, especially the part that is transported on the rivers.

Vu Ngoc Da
(Hanoi)

1751
CSO: 4209

STRENGTHEN INSPECTION AND CONTROL

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 Feb 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Increase the Level of Inspection and Control Activities"]

[Text] Inspection and control form one important component of the guidance and management work. In the process of organizing the implementation of the lines, policies and work, the guidance and management echelons cannot just rely on the unique source of information provided by the reports submitted by lower echelons, they must also carry out on a permanent basis the work of inspection and control in order to have a solid grasp of the implementation situation, to discover the new elements that could be promoted, the errors and shortcomings that need to be attended to. The correctness of the lines and policies as verified by reality is also to be confirmed through the inspection process; those aspects showing deficiencies and loopholes can be attended to and improved upon. The work of inspection and control will also help the leading echelons to firmly grasp and correctly assess one's cadres, to discover those talents that need nurturing and deserve advancement and those who are weak and depraved who need to be replaced in time.

The inspection organs are the eyes and ears of the higher echelons, they are also the friends of the lower echelons since they are an instrument for effectively serving the leading and management echelons. They are an expression of the right to collective ownership of the laboring people in the oversight of government organs operations. At the various localities and in the various sectors from the central level down to the district level, from the ministries and general departments down to the district services and offices, there has been formed a State control system. As the collective owner of the society, the laboring people also organizes for itself a people's control and inspection network at many grassroot units. Over 300,000 progressive workers and government workers, elite cooperative members and a relatively large number of retired cadres have been trusted by the people and nominated to serve in these people's inspection bodies.

Thanks to the expansion of our inspection force, the close combination of the State inspection work with that of the people's inspection bodies

has yielded more and more results every day. Many State inspection organs have taken the initiative of coordinating with various sectors and related departments to carry out many complex inspection operations, reaching good results in the solution of complaints and grievances. Many inspection organs in the provinces and municipalities as well as in a number of sectors and the central level have organized many inspection waves which serve to stop negative phenomena from developing in the production bases, in the food, food product and consumer good management and distribution links, to protect commodities while in transit and on the road, and to implement the rear - army policies, and to build the new economic zones. The inspection work also serve to actively promote the building of the Party and the building of government authority at the grassroot level.

In 1980 the inspection bodies have the task of assisting the various leadership and management echelons so as to boost the movement for overcoming negative phenomena in our economic and social life, especially such evil phenomena as stealing, bribery and maltreatment of the masses. The close coordination among the various inspection organs in each locality, each section and within the entire country, and between the government inspection work on the one hand and the people's inspection work on the other, will be the important condition for guaranteeing the effectiveness of our inspection work. The mission of the inspection work requires not only that it reflects accurately, faithfully and in timely fashion the situation of the fight against negative phenomena and its results but also that it come up with concrete and practical suggestions meant to stop and roll back such phenomena, including the replacement of inept and unqualified cadres, the strict punishment of thieves, bribe takers, and oppressors of the masses, and the elimination of illegal protection and sheltering of criminals.

The inspection work is essentially carried out on the economic front. For this reason, the inspection cadres, especially those in charge of the inspection organs, must be fully conversant with economic matters, they must have professional understanding and be capable of organizing the inspection work. They must also have good character and be moved by the spirit of fighting on behalf of the truth, on behalf of the collective ownership of the laboring people.

The cadres and personnel of government inspection organs as well as of the people's inspection organizations must strive their best and contribute to the direct bolstering of our revolutionary undertaking and to the cleansing of the State machinery and of our cadres' ranks.

1751
CSO: 4209

BRIEFS

ARTISAN INDUSTRY, HANDICRAFTS SECTOR--At present, the nation's artisan industry and handicrafts sector includes nearly 3,000 cooperatives, 2,800 production teams, and 20,000 other commercial bases. They employ 1.5 million workers and produce tens of thousands of products to meet domestic and export needs. In 1978 the sector's total production value, which amounted to 3.5 million dong, accounted for 60.4 percent of the total value of industrial production and 31.4 percent of the total production value of all industry. [Excerpt] [Hanoi TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 79 p 3] 5616

CSO: 4209

BRIEFS

HA SON BINH PLANTING--Ha Son Binh Province is concentrating on winding up the transplanting of 70,000 hectares of spring rice during February and on completing the planting of 20,000 hectares of manioc during March. [Excerpt] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Feb 80 p 1]

CSO: 4209

BUILDING MATERIAL INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Feb 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Develop the Building Material Industry"]

[Text] The State Plan this year allocates 2.2 percent more as capital to invest in basic construction, in which the building and assembly capital increases by 5.5 percent as compared to last year. To guarantee the implementation of the new plan, it is required that we solve well the boosted production of building materials.

In the last year, the building materials sector has made significant efforts in the construction and putting into operation of many cement, brick and tile works, thus increasing our capacity of production by 40,000 tons of cement and 370,000,000 bricks and tiles. Many mechanical devices and equipment such as "te" [phonetic transcription], valves, bearings, bearing crushers, hand-operated and half-mechanized tile makers have been manufactured and put into operation. Many more base units have also expanded the production of floor tiles, ceramic tiles, refractory tiles, antiacid tiles, and silicate tiles, etc.

Though it has made progress, the building materials production branch is still a weak link in construction. The investments going into building materials industry are still inadequate. In the first 3 years of the second 5-year plan, whereas the average increase in basic construction was 13.7 percent the average increase in building materials production was only 10.6 percent. The cost/benefit ratio on the capital invested was also small. The actual construction of the building materials production plants usually took much longer than the time projected and just dragged on. A number of brick factories were put down in the construction plan but the initial preparations were very time consuming. Then there were those parts in the plants that were already completed but they were not put into operation incrementally. In our situation of gas and oil shortage which limits our transportation by bruck, many of our production chain operations were delayed in their assembly and in their being put into operation. Many instruments and means of exploitation and production of building materials were slow in being produced and equipped such as the

rock saws, rock cutters, lock T-squares, molded steel, corrugated iron molds, etc. Many kinds of secondary or residual products such as coal slag, cement mix, wooden odds and ends, scrap iron, bits of welding rods, etc. have not been thoroughly utilized. The phenomenon of wasteful utilization of materials in many construction units due to incorrect application of specifications, to inaccurate weighing and gauging which causes losses in the stock, to entering and issuing of materials not in accord with the allocation regime, and to rudimentary warehouse facilities which leads to corruption and stealing, etc. has led to a rate of 6 percent waste of capital goods and building materials as compared to the construction capital of each unit. Among the 136 works that various sectors are trying to build but which are not proceeding in uniform fashion and thus drag out their time of completion, there are 23 which have been delayed because they are wanting in construction or other materials, causing capital investments running into the billions of dong to be held up.

To overcome the above weaknesses, to exploit our present and potential capabilities, to fully utilize all the resources available in the country, to boost and expand the production of building materials so as t respond in time to our growing construction requirements, all of these constitute an urgent task. The building materials sector must be reorganized in the direction of more concentration and specialization, of more and adequate investments so as to build from scratch and/or ameliorate and expand middle and large scale state-operated production bases, of gradual progress toward mechanization and modernization, while at the same time expanding the middle and small scale bases at the various localities, providing correct guidance to the state-private joint production and to the cooperative production bases. We must concentrate on building quickly those major projects of the government regarding building materials such as the cement plants, the brick and tile enterprises, the wood and rock exploitation bases, etc. which have modern equipment and large capacity. Those that are in operation should strive to push the movement for rationalization of production, for technical improvement, for management improvement, and for increasing the labor productivity so as to increase fast their production volume, raise their quality and reduce the final costs of goods produced. The public-private joint bases and the cooperative building materials production bases must be assisted in the area of production techniques, of equipment buying and management so as to raise their productivity and their quality, to save on coal, burning wood, and oil, and to lower the final costs, which can only profit the collective and people's economy.

Building materials account for 60 to 70 percent of the final cost of the building projects. To lower the final cost of building materials through the economic use of land, raw material, capital and oil and gas, must become the everyday motto of every production base. Such phenomena as the stealing of public property, of raw and construction materials, the setting up of illegal connections, shoddy and uncontrolled manufacturing, and the non-compliance with the collection and distribution policies, must be stopped and eliminated.

To develop the building materials industry in balance with the tasks of building the material and technological bases of socialism constitutes an important direction of work of the entire construction sector.

1751
CSO: 4209

BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Nguyễn Đức An [NGUYEENX DUWCS AN]

*Deputy chief of the Financial Planning Department, State Planning Commission; he is the author of an article in this issue entitled, "Some Thoughts on Financial Planning at the District and Provincial Levels." (TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA No 2, Feb 79 pp 23-27)

Phan Anh [PHAN ANH]

President of the Vietnam Lawyers Association; on 11 April 1980 he addressed the 6th Congress of the Vietnam Lawyers Association. (NHAN DAN 14 Apr 80 p 1)

Thái Xuân Ân [THAIS XUAAN AAN]

*Deputy chief of the Hanoi Municipal Planning Commission; attended a discussion on revamping planning work in industrial enterprises held in Hanoi on 4 and 5 December 1978. (TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA No 1, Jan 79 p 13)

Đặng Trần Bằng [DAWNGJ TRAANF BANGR]

*Assistant to the Chairman of the Council for the Ratification of Mineral Deposits, Council of Ministers; *Deputy Chief of Cabinet of the State Science and Technology Commission; he is the author of an article in this issue which reviews the past 10 years' activities of the Council for the Ratification of Mineral Deposits. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC No 1, Jan 80 pp 16-18 & 21)

Lê Thanh Bình [LEE THANH BINHF]

*Chief of the Territorial Balance and Regional Economic Planning Department, State Plann ng Commission; he is the author of an article in this

issue on formulation of the 1980 plan by Quang Xuong District, Thanh Hoa Province. (TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA No 10, Oct 79 pp 11-17)

Bùi Văn Các [BUIF VAWN CACS]

Vice Minister of Building; he is the author of an article in this issue on taking over construction projects delivered in the 1980 Plan. (XAY DUNG No 12, Dec 79 pp 1-2)

Phạm Cảnh [PHAMJ CANHR]

*Deputy chief of the Department of Industrial Statistics, Statistics General Department; he is the author of an article in this issue on economic information for artisan and handicrafts industries. (TAP CHI THONG KE No 2, Apr 79 pp 15-19 & 54)

Hoàng Cao [HOANGF CAO], *Senior Colonel

Author of an article in this issue entitled, "Lai Chau and the Mission of a Strategic Unit of the People's War and National Defense on the First Line of the Fatherland." (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 12, Dec 79 pp 41-55)

Lã Ngọc Châu [LAX NGOCJ CHAAU], Senior Colonel

His article on the Ground Forces Officers School #1 appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 Apr 80 p 3)

Đặng Văn Chung [DAWNGJ VAWN CHUNG], Professor

President of the Vietnam Association of Internal Medicine; attended a meeting of the Association's executive committee held in Hanoi on 3 August 1979. (NOI KHOA No 4, Oct-Dec 79 p 33)

Ngô Thanh Dương [NGOO THANH ZUWOWNG]

*Head of the Theory Department of the Nguyen Ai Quoc School; on 16 April 1980 he attended the opening session of the Conference on Leninist Science and the Present. (NHAN DAN 17 Apr 80 p 1)

Đào Minh Đệ [DAOF MINH DEEJ]

*Deputy chief of the Department of Supplementary Education, Ministry of Education; was member of a group that inspected illiteracy eradication and supplementary education work in Hanoi from 6 to 10 November 1979. (TAP SAN BO TUC VAN HOA No 5, Oct 79 p 22)

Hoàng Bửu Đôn [HOANGF BUWUR DOON]

*Publisher of LAM NGHIEP [Forestry], the journal of the Ministry of Forestry; his name appears on the masthead of the publication. (LAM NGHIEP No 1, 1979)

Lưu Quang Hà [LUWU QUANG HAF]

*President of the Hanoi Advanced School of Industrial Art; he is the author of an article in this issue on industrial art and intellectuals. (TO QUOC No 2, Feb 80 pp 32-35)

Trần Văn Hợp [TRAANF VAWN HOWPJ]

Director General of the Vietnam Federation of Tea Enterprises; he is the author of an article in this issue entitled, "Some Thoughts on Building the Vietnam Federation of Tea Enterprises." (LUONG THUC THUC PHAM No 8, Aug 79 pp 6-9)

Trần Huệ [TRAANF HUEEJ]

*Chief of the Grain Service of Gia Lai--Kon Tum Province; he is the author of an article in this issue on producing, processing and marketing manioc in Kontum City. (LUONG THUC THUC PHAM No 9, Sep 79 pp 7-9 & 27)

Nguyễn Quang Huy [NGUYEENX QUANG HUY]

Ambassador of the SRV in Burma; on 12 April 1980 he attended the arrival in Rangoon of SRV Premier Pham Van Dong. (NHAN DAN 14 Apr 80 p 4)

Huỳnh Đắc Hưởng [dUYNHF DAWCS HUWOWNG], *Major General

He is the author of an article in this issue entitled, "Civil Proselyting Work and the Implementation of the Nationalities Policy and Strength of the Local People's Warfare in the Border Region." (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN No 1, Jan 80 pp 38-45)

Phạm Khúc [PHAMJ KHUCS], Dr

*Vice President of the Vietnam Association of Internal Medicine; attended a meeting of the Association's executive committee held in Hanoi on 3 August 1979. (NOI KHOA No 4, Oct-Dec 79 p 33)

Phạm Long [PHAMJ LONG]

*Member and Secretary of the People's Committee of Na Hang District, Ha Tuyen Province; spoke at a conference on building a culture and information structure at the basic level organized in early October 1979 by the District People's Committee. (VAN HOA NGHE THUAT No 1, Jan 80 p 79)

Nguyễn Đức Lộc [NGUYEENX DUWCS LOOCJ]

*Deputy chief of the Institute of Arts; was a member of the Vietnamese delegation that attended the International Scientific Conference on "Culture, Art and the Education of the New Socialist Person" held in Sophia,

Bulgaria on 23, 24 and 26 October 1979. (TAP CHI VAN HOC No 6, Nov-Dec 79 pp 142-143)

Hồng Nghi [HOONGF NGHI]

*Secretary General of the Vietnam Motion Picture Association; attended a meeting of the motion picture sector held on 18 July 1979. (DIEN ANH No 5, Sep-Oct 79 p 58)

Nguyễn Xuân Ngọc [NGUYEENX XUAAN NGOCJ]

*Head of the Central Institute of Zoning and Planning [Vien Phan vung quy hoach trung uong]; was head of the Vietnamese delegation that attended the 8th conference of regional scientists of socialist countries held in Mongolia from 6 to 10 September 1978. (TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA No 1, Jan 79 p 39)

Nguyễn Đức Nùng [NGUYEENX DUWCS NUNGF]

*Head of the Institute of Fine Arts, Ministry of Culture and Information; attended a discussion of the writing of the history of Vietnam's fine arts for the period from end 19th century to 1945. (NGHIEN CUU NGHE THUAT No 1, Jan-Feb 80 p 107)

Nguyễn Trọng Oánh [NGUYEENX TRONGJ OANHS]

*Editor-in-Chief of VAN NGHE QUAN DOI [Army Arts and Letters], the monthly journal of arts and letters for the military; attended a recent meeting of writers and collaborators for the journal. (VAN NGHE QUAN DOI No 3, Mar 80 p 140)

Nguyễn Thế Phẩn [NGUYEENX THEES PHAANS]

*Deputy Director of the Su That Publishing House; on 16 April 1980 he attended the opening session of the Conference on Leninist Science and the Present. (NHAN DAN 17 Apr 80 p 1)

Lê Văn Phong [LEE VAWN PHONG]

*Head of the Planning Commission of Quang Nam--Da Nang Province; he is the author of an article in this issue on improving the quality of planning work in the province. (TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA No 2, Feb 79 pp 18-22 & 30)

Nguyễn Văn Phùng [NGUYEENX VAWN PHUNGF]

*Deputy Head of the Department for Research in Party History of the VCP Central Committee; on 16 April 1980 he attended the opening session of the Conference on Leninist Science and the Present. (NHAN DAN 17 Apr 80 p 1)

Nguyễn Tử Qua [NGUYEENX TUWR QUA]

Deputy chief of the Institute of Economic Mathematics, State Planning Commission; he is the author of an article in this issue on studying the application of economic mathematics in economic planning and management work. (TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA No 1, Jan 79 pp 32-36)

Bùi Hữu Sảng [BUIF HUWUX SANGR] aka Bùi Triệu Dương [BUIF TRIEEU ZUWOWNG] Deceased

Former Deputy Director of the Vietnam Theater of Comedy born on 1 January 1920; died on 20 November 1979 at the Vietnam-Soviet Hospital in Hanoi. (SAN KHAU No 6, Nov-Dec 79 p 48)

Nguyễn Văn Sơn [NGUYEENX VAWN SOWN]

*Head of the Political Economics Department of the Nguyen Ai Quoc School; on 16 April 1980 he attended the opening session of the Conference on Leninist Science and the Present. (NHAN DAN 17 Apr 80 p 1)

Trần Linh Sơn [TRAANF LINH SOWN]

*Deputy Director of the Vietnam National Bank; he appears as one of the signors of the system for statistics and accounting for agricultural and agricultural-forestry cooperatives published in this issue. (TAP CHI THONG KE No 6, Dec 78 pp 2-15)

Bùi Thế Tâm [BUIF THEES TAAM], *Senior Colonel

He is the author of an article in this issue entitled, "Promoting Production and Creating On-the-Spot Sources of Grain and Food." (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN No 1, Jan 80 pp 46-53)

Huy Thanh [HUY THANH]

*Chief of the Population Statistics Department, Statistics General Department; he is the author of an article in this issue on preparations for the upcoming general census. (TAP CHI THONG KE No 6, Dec 78 pp 16-19)

Phạm Thành [PHAMJ THANHF]

*Director of the Su That Publishing House; on 16 April 1980 he attended the opening session of the Conference on Leninist Science and the Present. (NHAN DAN 17 Apr 80 p 1)

Hoàng Minh Thảo [HOANGF MINH THAOR], Lieutenant General

Director of the Senior Military Academy; on 16 April 1980 he attended the opening session of the Conference on Leninist Science and the Present. (NHAN DAN 17 Apr 80 p 1)

Lê Thu [LEE THU]

*Member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Women's Union; was member of a group that inspected illiteracy eradication and supplementary education work in Hanoi from 6 to 10 November 1979. (TAP SAN BO TUC VAN HOA No 5, Oct 79 p 22)
NOTE: This individual also has been reported under the name Đỗ-Thị-Tạc [DOOX THIJ TACJ]

Nguyễn Thụ [NGUYEENX THUJ]

*Deputy chief of the Motion Picture Department and *Director of the Vietnam Movie Enterprise; attended ceremonies in Hanoi on 16 August 1979 to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Vietnam Movie Enterprise. (DIEN ANH No 5, Sep-Oct 79 p 58)

Văn Tình [VAWN TINHF]

*Deputy Chief of the Department of Standardization, Metrology and Quality Control; he is the author of an article in this issue on the 1980 tasks for this department. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC No 1, Jan 80 pp 5-8 & 12)

Võ Xuân Triều [VOX ZUAAN TRIEEU], *Major

"A veteran military intelligence cadre" who visited troops on one of the Spratley Islands; mentioned in an article on the Spratley Islands published in this issue. (TO QUOC No 2, Feb 80 pp 36-40)

Lê Trình [LEE TRINHF]

*Chief of the Science and Technology Committee of Thai Binh Province; he is the author of an article in this issue on implementing programs for science and technology advances in agriculture in the province. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC No 1, Jan 80 pp 13-15)

Lê Quang Tuấn [LEE QUANG TUAANS]

*Deputy Head of the Emulation Department of the VCP Central Committee; recently he was appointed to the Committee to Organize the Celebration of the 110th Anniversary of Lenin's Birthday. (NHAN DAN 17 Apr 80 p 1)

Đào Duy Tùng [DAOF ZUY TUNGF]

Alternate Member of the VCP Central Committee; *Standing Member of the Department for Research on Party History of the VCP Central Committee; on 16 April 1980 he attended the opening session of the Conference on Leninist Science and the Present. (NHAN DAN 17 Apr 80 p 1)

CSO: 4209 END

SELECTIVE LIST OF JPRS SERIAL REPORTS

ASIA SERIAL REPORTS

JAPAN REPORT
KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT
MONGOLIA REPORT
SOUTH AND EAST ASIA REPORT
VIETNAM REPORT

WORLDWIDE SERIAL REPORTS

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Environmental Quality
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Epidemiology
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Law of the Sea
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Nuclear Development and Proliferation
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Telecommunications Policy, Research and Development

END OF FICHE DATE FILMED

24 June 1980

D.D.